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East Timorese students 
still in danger 
The four East Timorese st1Jdents who hove been trying 
since lost October to leave Indonesia seem as far as ever 
from their objective. Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar 
Kusumaatmaja declared in February that Indonesia cannot 
allow them to leave with Portuguese passports because 
this would be tantamount to admitting that East Timor is 
not part of Indonesia [ Kompos, 28 February]. 
Following Mochtor's statement, the Dutch embassy in 
Jakarta announced that they were abandoning their efforts 
to help the students leave though said that they would 
continue to be in contact with the four. 
The Portuguese government have now taken the matter 
into their own hands and are believed to be discussing 
the question with Indonesia through contacts at the UN in 
New York. 
Living in a slate of fear 
A Japanese journalist in Jakarta who hos spoken to the 
students, reports that they continue to be in a state of 
great anxiety and under the constant watch of the 
security forces who visit them several times a week. He 
writes that they ore thought to be Fretilin supporters 
who have sent information about conditions in East Timor 
to support groups in Lisbon and Australia. 
"We were told that corresponding with people abroad is 
regarded as subversive. We decided to seek refuge abroad 
because our personal safety is no longer guaranteed." 
They visit the Dutch embassy and the International Red 
Cross office almost every day but feel that there hos 
been no satisfactory progress in their case. 
There ore about 110 East Timorese studying in Jakarta 
but they have no organisation to support each other, so 
the four are alone in their resistance [Yomiuri Shimbun, 
10 March]. 
The right to reject Indonesian citizenship 
Speaking at a press conference in Jakarta on 27 
February, Mochtar accused the Portuguese government of 
using the students for political purposes by granting 
them Portuguese passports [Jakarta Post, 28 February]. He 
also attacked the Dutch embassy in Jakarta for promising 
the four that they would be given Portuguese passports 
[ Kompas, 28 February). This was the second such action by 
the embassy, he said. The first was when they helped four 
West Papuans leave in 1984 'by giving them free tickets". 
He claimed that the four had forfeited their chance to 
retain Portuguese cif'izenship when this was offered to 
East Timorese under a memorandum of understanding reached 
between Indonesia c1nd Portugal. But as Mochtar knows very 
well, this memorandum offered the option of Portuguese 
citizenship only to those wanting to join families abroad 
or those who worked for the Portuguese administration 
before 1975. The students had no such option and are now 
trying to extricate themselves from enforced Indonesian 
citizenship over which they were given no choice. 
Dutch treachery and Indonesian blackmail 
The Dutch government and its embassy in Jakarta must 
bear pri mory responsibility for the danger now faced by 
the students. 
In a telex to the Dutch Foreign Minister on 1 Morch 
immediately ofter Mochtor's statement, Lord Avebury, 
chair of the Parliamentary Human Rights Group, urged 
Holland to give the students Dutch travel documents to 
make their journey to Lisbon, buf' this idea hos been 
rejected. 
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Portugal's diplomatic offensive 
The Portuguese government hos vetoed o move by the 
European Community to upgrade its office in Jakarta to 
embassy level because of Indonesia's illegal occupation 
of East Timor. As o result the Jakarta office will remain 
o sub-office of the Community's embassy in Bangkok. 
Portugal is also to boycott the April meeting in Jakarta 
of the EEC-ASEAN Joint Commission at which senior 
officials wi 11 discuss trade and economic relations 
between the two blocs. [The Guardian, 6 Morch 1987] 
Portugal boycotted last October's meeting of EEC and 
ASEAN foreign ministers and is certain to boycott the 
next ministerial meeting later this year, probably in 
October. Indonesia is currently ASE AN president which is 
why all ASEAN meetings at present ore being held in 
Jakarta. 
Portugal's latest move is symptomatic of the diplomatic 
offensive which now characterises Portugal's position 
internationally on the question of East Timor, and is in 
contrast to the country's former position which was far 
less assertive and principled. How is this development to 
be explained and how sustainable is it likely to be? Many 
things have come together to bring about this change. 
Internal political developments 
Up to the 1986 presidential election, the former 
president, General AntoninoRamalho Eanes was seen as the 
most principled political figure on East Timor. But he 
encountered great difficulty implementing his 
presidential mandate towards East Timor because of the 
divergence of views between him and the government under 
Mario Soares. It was feared at the time that the defeat 
of Mrs Pintasilgo, an independent, who had been President 
Eanes' special advisor on East Timor,would augur badly 
for East Timor, losing it a champion at the summit of 
Portuguese state power, as she hod been more sympathetic 
than Mario Soares when he was prime minister. 
However the opposite seems to hove happened. Onoe Mario 
Soares was elected president he hos, if anything, been 
even more outspoken on East Timor than his predecessor, 
using every opportunity to press the issue, in 
international gatherings, at the European Community and 
in meetings with other heads of state. Moreover, his 
presidential initiaflves are now matched by statements 
and acts at the government level. The closer political 
affinity between o president from the Socialist Party and 
a government which is o coalition of socialists and 
social democrats hos removed the earlier discords that 
hampered cooperation between the president and the 
government. 
It may be that Mr Soares now sees East Timor as the one 
major issue on which he, as president, has a special 
responsibility. But it is also acknowledged in Lisbon 
that he was deeply impressed by a private conversation he 
had in Lisbon in the summer of 1985 with Monsignor Carlos 
Ximenes Belo, head of the Catholic Church in Dili, who 
told him that Fretilin was not communist but nationalist 
and enjoyed widespread support LJill Jolliffe in The Age, 
4 September 1985]. 
But former president Eanes whose party is the third 
largest and holds the balance of power in parliament is 
just as determined, out of office, to keep East Timor in 
the public eye. He declared, in o speech to foreign 
correspondents in Lisbon on 10 February, that Portugal 
had a moral obligation to help East Timor achieve 
independence and he called upon the government to support 
the independence movement financially. He seems to be 
trying to push Portuguese politicians even further in 
support of East Timor. 
There is today in Portugal o striking unanimity between 
parties of the right and left on the question of East 
Timor. No party, it should be said, hos ever opposed the 
just demand for self-determination for East Timor, but 
until the early 1980s, East Timor was often less a 
question of principle than of recrimination between 
parties. The right-wing parties, not unlike right-wing 
parties in other former metropolitan countries, hove 
tended to hove a paternalistic loyalty towards former 
colonial people, and blamed the left, in many cases not 
unjustly, for failing to support East Timor in the early 
years of the Indonesian invasion. (The Jakarta regime, 
incidentally, completely distorts the policy of Lisbon's 
leftwing government in the mid 1970s.) 
The impasse in consultations with Indonesia 
These internal developments have been encouraged by the 
current impasse in the UN-sponsored talks between 
Portugal and Indonesia. A resolution of the UN General 
Assembly in 1982 called on the UN Secretory-General to 
initiate consultations on East Timor between the parties 
directly concerned. These consultations started in 1983 
but only Portugal and Indonesia were involved because the 
Secretary-General ignored persistent demands that the 
East Timorese people should be drown in. 
The consultations have led only to on agreement on the 
repatriation to Portugal of East Timorese who formerly 
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worked for the Portuguese colonial administration and 
refused to adopt Indonesian citizenship. Once this matter 
hod been resolved, there was nowhere for the talks to go 
other than to discuss the issue of self-determ inotion. 
But on this, the two sides ore diametrically opposed. 
No-one hos yet publicly declared that the consultations 
hove broken down but the speeches mode by the Portuguese 
and Indonesian representatives at the UN Human Rights 
Commission in Geneva in February clearly point in that 
direction. In response to Portugol 's condemnation of the 
illegal elections in East Timor [see separate item], 
Indonesia's delegate questioned Portugal's "real 
intention ... with regard to the ongoing talks". Jakarta 
hos always seen the talks as a compromise of its claim to 
hove integrated East Timor but hoped to use them to win 
Portuguese acquiescence. Now that this hos turned out to 
be on empty dream, it wonts to place the blame for a 
breakdown on Lisbon. Indeed, much of Jakarta's propaganda 
is aimed at maligning and distorting Portuguese pol icy, 
even blaming the present democratic regime in Lisbon for 
what went on in East Timor during the fascist era. 
In the post year or so, Portuguese politicians hove 
AUSTRALIA 
seen Indonesian policy for what it is, and with the UN-
sponsored consultations on the brink of collapse, no-one 
in Portugal con see any point any more in exercising 
caution towards Indonesia, as if it could make the talks 
more fruitful. This hos certainly helped pave the way to 
the current diplomatic offensive. 
Portugal in the European Community 
Portugal's accession to the European Community in 
January 1986 hos provided politicians at all levels with 
on important international forum to fight for East Timor. 
President Soares hos mode use of it, the Prime Minister 
and Foreign Minister hove mode use of it, particularly by 
boyc:ott Ing EEC events in Jakarta, and Portuguese members 
of the European Parliament hove used the Parliament to 
particularly good effect. The importance of this forum 
should not be underestimated as Lisbon now hos regular 
consultations with West European countries two of whom 
(Greece and Ireland) supported the 1982 UN resolution on 
East Timor while the other seven abstained. 
Portugal con be expected to lobby much harder than 
hitherto with its EEC partners in the likely event that a 
resolution is token this year at the UN. Portuguese 
membership of the EEC hos morkedl y improve the 
international prospects for East Timor. 
I_ EASTTIMOR -
Parliamentary initiatives 
Finally, there is Portugal's notional parliament. In 
1982, a parliamentary commission "to follow up the 
si tuotion in East Ti mor'' was created. While it appears to 
hove token few initiatives in its early years, it hos 
recently emerged as a key lobby for East Timor. Its 
twenty-three members come from all the six parties right 
across the political spectrum, the social democrats, the 
socialists, thecammunists, the Democratic Renewal Porty, 
the Democratic Centre Porty and the Democroti c Movement. 
On 17 July 1986, the Port lament unanimously passed a 
resolution reasserting East Timor's right to self-
determinotion and rejecting "the integration into 
Indonesia of this territory against the free will of its 
people and in notorious violation of the principles of 
international low". It declared itself to be available to 
participate in oAy future initiative seeking a solution 
that will take into account the legitimate aspirations of 
the people of East Timor". 
In November it produced a unanimous report summarising 
the events leading to the Indonesian invasion in 1975 and 
a chronology of events on the international scene since 
1975, particularly the actions by Portuguese politicians 
in favour of East Timor. The final conclusion of this 
impressive 38-poge document is worth quoting in full: 
"Portugal, the administering state (of East Timor), has 
continued to assert the right of the East 1Timorese to 
self-determination, and it will, with every means at its 
disposal, fight unceasingly to ensure that the East Timor 
people may freely choose their own future, thereby making 
good the principles in international low, in the UN 
Charter and (UN) Deliberations, thereby enforcing the 
contents of Article 297 of the Portuguese Constitution 
and complying with the wishes of the Portuguese people on 
the matter, repeatedly asserted unanimously in successive 
deliberations in the country's Parliament." 
This report is intended as a guide not only for 
Parliament but also for the government and for Portuguese 
embassies throughout the world. A major initiative 
planned by the Portuguese Parliament is on international 
conference of parliamentarians in Lisbon in June this 
year to consider ways of strengthening the international 
political and diplomatic campaign in support ·of the 
people of East Timor. Portugal now looks set to becoming 
a major force on the international scene supporting self-
determinotion for East Timor. 
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Indonesia's illegal election 
On 23 Apri 1 Indonesia wi 11 conduct an illegal election in 
East Timor. The Portuguese government told the UN Human 
Rights Commission in February that Indonesia was able to 
conduct the election thanks only to its military 
occupation of the country. It hod nothing whatever to do 
with the exercise of any right to choose by the people of 
East Timor. 
This was a rebuff to Jakarta which intends to portray 
this event as proof that the people of East Timor accept 
'integrasi '. The Indonesian ambassador to the UN, Ali 
Alotas claimed that the elections "will again prove that 
the East Timorese have recognised the fact" that they are 
also part of Indonesia [Jakarta Post, 11 February]. It is 
not unlikely that western or ASEAN diplomats will be 
prevailed upon to observe the event, as if to give it 
legitimacy. No-one doubts that Jakarta will claim a near 
complete turnout; in the last elections, the number of 
votes allegedly cast actually exceeded the number of 
voters . It is wel 1 to remember that anyone refusing to 
vote would be accused of supporting the resistance. 
It is instructive to examine the measures being taken 
to 'safeguard' the conduct of the elections. 
Voting procedures 
The elections are being held for three assemblies, the 
central parliament (DPR), the provincial assembly (DPRD-
1) and the sub-district assembly (DPR0-11). There are 62 
election committees (ponitya pemungutan suara) in East 
Timor and the number of registered voters is officially 
said to be 357,754. 
Special voting arrangements have been established for 
East Timor as well as for West Papua, the other territory 
where armed resistance against Indonesian rule is being 
waged. In December 1986, Interior Affairs Minister, 
retired General Soepardjo Roestam announced that, unlike 
the 25 provinces in Indonesia where voters will cast 
their votes for each of the three elections in a single 
box for each assembly (a yellow box for parliament, a 
white box for the DPRD-1 and a blue box for the DPRD-11), 
in West Papua and East Timor, there will be three boxes 
for each of the assemblies, one for each of the parties, 
hence, a total of nine boxes [ Kompas, 22 January 1987). 
The same procedure was used in East Timor in 1982. 
Voters in East Timor will therefore have to place their 
voting slips in the box for the 'chosen' party without 
piercing a party symbol or doing anything to the slip. 
Besides enabling election officials to check on how 
people vote, it will eliminate the chance for voters to 
write words of protest on their voting slips. 
Voters will first surrender their 'model-C form' (a 
special requirement for East Timor) and announce their 
name to an official who will hand out a yellow voting 
slip (for parliament) which must immediately be placed in 
a party box. The voter wil 1 then report for the next slip 
and repeat the process for the other two assemblies. 
One can only speculate on the reasons for this special 
procedure. The authorities certainly regard the West 
Papuans and East Timorese as too immature to vote like 
everyone else. But this methvd enables the authorities to 
guarantee that Golkar,wins a comfortable (huge?) majority 
as a sign that the East Timorese and the West Papuans 
accept Indonesian rule. Although under the new rules, the 
military insist that they do not toke sides with Golkar, 
A confident John Nuro, PPP chr1irmon, poses in front of 
the PPP office in Dili. [Jak01to Post, 19 July 1986] 
in the special coses of East Timor and West Papua they 
may fecir that votes cast for the other parties could be 
interpreted as being protest votes. 
Whatever the reason, Jakarta evidently regards the 
elections in its two colonial territories as needing far 
greater control and manipulation than elsewhere. 
Security during the elections 
The offensive launched lost year by the Indonesian army 
codenamed Operasi Kikis (Operation Extinction) was in 
part aimed at securing 'successful' elections. In 
addition to combat and territorial troops, there are 
several para-military forces consisting primarily of East 
Timorese whose duties will be intensified during the 
elections. These forces ore collectively known as 
'Hansip-Wankamra' and consist of five separate units: 
Indonesian thoughts on a referendum 
in East Timor 
Responding to suggestions that this year's general 
election in East Timor could be regarded as a 
referendum on self-determination, the governor of 
East Timor, Mario Carrascaloo, recently stated that 
the people of East Timor do not need any referendum. 
He said such a thing would be contrary to the laws 
and Constitution of the unitary Indonesian Republic 
and that East Timorese "as Indonesian citizens" would 
abide by all the laws and regulations concerning the 
elections. Therefore only three parties, the Golkar, 
the PPP and the POI, could toke port. All Timorese 
parties 1 ike Freti lin and the UDT [of which he was a 
member] are hanned, he said. 
The Indonesian-appointed governor called for 
vigilance against "libelous reports" in the foreign 
press that "could harm our political system" [Jakarta 
Post, 9 March 1987). 
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Wanra, Kamra, Ratih, Hansip and TBO. The first three are 
the ones likely to be used for security purposes during 
the elections. 
Wanra or People's Defence and Ratih or Trained People's 
Force are under army control. Wanra functions under the 
com maid of K orem 164/ Wi ro Dhar mo, the mi Ii tary comm and 
for the whole of East Timor, whilst Ratlh units function 
under the 13 kodim or district military commands. Komra 
or People's Security units, which are attached to the 
police, were set up more recently, following the major 
military operations in 1981. During the 1982 elections, 
Kamra units were given special tasks in order to give the 
police a more conspicuous role than the army. 
The present-day strength of these units is not known, 
but figures for 1982 were given in a set of Indonesian 
-
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military documents captured by Fretilin on 28 August 
1983: 4,800 in Kamro, 7,800 in Ratih and 1,690 Komro, 
giving a total of 14,290 men. Although some members of 
these units are known to have defected to Fretilin in 
1983, it is not unlikely that oil three units will hove 
increased in number since then. 
The use of special para-military forces during 
elections is confined to East Timor and West Papua. In 
Indonesia, security round the polling-booths is largely 
left to the police and the Hansip (Civil Defence). 
Arms sales to Indonesia attacked in House of Lords 
In a debate on the arms trade and human rights, initiated 
in the House of Lords by veteran Labour politician, 97-
year old Lord Fenner Brockway, Lord Avebury, choir of the 
Parliamentary Human Rights Group, strongly condemned the 
British government's promotion of "trade in weapons of 
mass destruction with evil dictatorships such as those of 
Indonesia and Chi le". 
He dealt in particular with the present military 
situation in East Ti mor where, according to reports in 
the second half of 1986, a renewed military offensive hod 
been launched. Lord Avebury quoted from a letter of 16 
January he received from the Foreign Secretary, Sir 
Geoffrey Howe, which in effect confirmed these reports. 
The Foreign Secretory wrote: "Military activity continues 
in both East Timor and Irion Jayo •••• We do ••• believe 
Indonesian military activity to have been stepped up in 
those areas where low-level conflict persists." 
Lord Avebury accused British governments since 1978 of 
spreading deception about the level of Indonesian 
m iii tary operations over the years. He quoted from a 
letter sent in June 1978 by a minister of state at the 
Foreign Office to Russell Johnston MP who had condemned 
Britain's decision to sell Hawk aircraft to Indonesia. 
Letter to the Edi tor 
Dear Editor, 
First, I thank you for having reviewed my book, FUNU: 
The l.kifinished Saga of East Timar, Red Sea Press Inc, New 
.Jersey (1986) in your bulletin of February 1987 (No 79, 
page 17). 
I take issue with Mr Jeremy Smithers' references such 
as: ''Yet, the book does not do justice to the 
independence struggle .•• and Fretilin's resilience." Did 
Mr Smithers read the last chapter entitled, "The Long 
March to Freedom''? 
He also wrote: " .•• he gives the curious impression that 
he has acted on his own in New York. Nowhere is there a 
sense of working with Fretilin representatives in Lisbon 
and elsewhere, and the movement inside East Timor."Well, 
that's the impression Mr Smithers got by reading my book. 
However, a more careful reading would show that I was 
in constant consultation with whoever else from Fretilin 
(was) present in New York for the UN General Assembly, 
and with our closest friends, namely the five African 
Lusophone States. More often than not, yes, I was alone, 
but acted on the basis of the fundamental guidelines 
approved by the entire Fret i Ii n leadership. 
I did not lose sight of the ''brooder campaign" but in 
view of the extreme space and financial limitations, I 
could not publish a complete "who's who" in the Timor 
solider ity movement. In the last port of the chapter, 
"The Quality of Mercy'!, I referred to the solidarity 
movement in brood terms. 
The letter claimed that "certain foreign observers who 
have been allowed to visit the territory have reported 
that the scale of skirmishing there has been greatly 
reduced". 
"It is not entirely accurate," Lord Avebury continued, 
"to refer to a war in which at least 100,000, probably 
200,000 people died as 'skirmishing'." 
Lord Avebury was equally scathing about foreign 
observers who, with very few exceptions, have visited 
East Timor since the occupation "as stooges of the regime 
••• prepared to accept the I ies and propaganda fed to 
them by the Indonesian forces." Requests by the 
ParliamentaryHumanRightsGroup to visit East Timorhad, 
by contrast, been refused point blank by the Indonesian 
government. "I suspect the Indonesians would like 
entirely to prevent the outside world from knowing what 
they are doing in East Timor. Particularly, they do not 
want anybody to observe the mi Ii tary operations that are 
currently toking place in the territory." 
[For a copy of Lord Avebury's speech and the government 
minister's reply, please send 50 pence to TAPOL.] 
It is ironic that only TAPOL 's review of my book 
questioned my loyalty to the Fretilin leadership in East 
Timor. I'll be with Fretilin as long as it remains loyal 
to the ideals that inspired me and many others in 1974 to 
seek independence for East Timar. It is regrettable that 
I hod l'o find more justice in the moinstrom media, such 
as The New York Times, The For Eust-ern Economic Review, 
and others. 
Jose Ramos Horta 
No arms for 
SUHARTO 
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Another defence team visits Indonesia 
A team of senior executives from leading British arms 
manufacturers visited Indonesia in February this year to 
discuss greater cooperation with IPTN, Indonesia's own 
aerospace industry. The executives were from British 
Aerospace and Rolls Royce, indicating that these two 
companies are anxious to become involved in IPTN 
expansion into the manufacture of aero engines and long-
range aircraft for the domestic market. According to some 
commentators, the mission offered Indonesia cooperation 
in manufacturing missiles as well as civil and military 
aircraft. 
T APOL has also learnt that an lndonE>sian team 
consisting possibly of officials from the Indonesian air 
force and IPTN will be atte:nding an International 
Aviation Tatoo t~ be held in July this year at the US air 
force base at Fairford in Gloucestershire. Although this 
tatoo is publicised as an event to raise money for the 
Royal Air Force Benevolent Fund by giving th: public a 
chance to see new aircraft and spectacular displays of 
aerobatics, it is also promoted as an occasion where, 
according to the official prospectus, high-ranking 
m ii itary personnel, senior government officials and 
executive personnel from around the world can "join an 
unprecedented gathering of professionals in a m ii itary 
environment and discuss their future requirements, 
procurement plans and policies." 
Duke boosts British trade with Indonesia 
The Duke of Kent with President Suharto. "Bdght 
prospects ••• " [Jakarla Poi;t, 4 February, 1987 
A high-powered British trade and industries m1ss1on, 
headed by the Duke of Kent, vice-chair of the British 
Overseas Trade Board, visited Indonesia in the first week 
of February, to give yet more vigour to growing British 
enthusiasm about trading with and investing in Indonesia. 
The Duke told a meeting of the Indonesian-British 
Association that British industry has made Indonesia a 
high priority for investments and exports. "Indonesia is 
one of the brightest longterm prospects as a partner for 
Britain in the developing world .•• because it is rich in 
US worried about Suharto's monoplies 
The US embassy in Jakarta has prepared a report on the 
extensive business ventures of members of the Suharto 
fomily. The report poys attention in particular to the 
long-term attempt by Suharto's three sons, Bambang, Tommy 
and Sigit to establish their economic wealth and power. 
According to the Far Eastern Economic Review, (26 
February, 1987),"the first family members see this as 
their way of maintaining power in the country when 
Suharto is no longer in power". 
The FEER two-column report of the embassy's study 
resulted in the Indonesian authorities banning that issue 
of the weekly. Normally, an unsavoury report about 
Indonesia results in the offending item being blacked 
out. Perhaps, the more punishing measure this time can be 
accounted for by the fact that the same issue also 
natural resources and labour, and has achieved sound 
financial management, political stability and military 
security". This statement points to the close connection 
between trade and investments and Britain's massive arms 
exports to Indonesia which the Foreign Office says is 
justified in order to enable Indonesia to build its 
'defence' capacity. 
During the Trade Board mission's visit it was revealed 
that Indonesia has now become the UK's sixth largest 
trading partner worldwide, whereas British investments 
rank fifth in Indonesia outside the oil sector, after 
Japan, Hong Kong, the US and Holland. Total British 
investments in Indonesia since the 1967 Foreign Capital 
Law amount to well over half a billion dollars in 180 
venlures covering banking, insurance and services as well 
as rubber, palm-oil and tea plantations. According to a 
recent figure from the Indonesian Investment Coordinating 
Board, British investments since 1967 totalled $572.1 
million, making the UK second only to Holland among the 
countries of western Europe [Jakarta Post, 2 December 
1986). 
The Duke said that the Overseas Trade Board had 
supported eighty British companies to take part in last 
year's trade fair in Jakarta and had helped ninety-nine 
companies to take part in trade missions to Indonesia 
during 1986. [Kompas and Jakarta Post, 3 March 1987) 
British exports to Indonesia reached £ 185 million In 
1986 as compared with £ 170 the previous year. They are 
expected to expand much faster from 1987 onwards as a 
result of the British government's decision last year to 
grant £140 million in soft loons to Indonesia over the 
com Ing three years. 
carried a highly complimentary review by Robin Osborn of 
Jose Ramos Horta's book, Funu, on Fretilin's eleven-year 
campaign for support at the United Nations. 
News of the US embassy report comes aily two months 
after the Asian Wall Street Journal carried three lengthy 
articles full of details about the Suharto family 
business empire (see TAPOL Bulletin, No 79, February 
1987). The embassy study which is confidential concludes 
that most of the Suharto family firms rely on a position 
of privileged control over an industry or import item. 
"Without the props provided by the current regulated 
system, there is a serious question as to the viability 
of their enterprises. Presumably the risk to the family 
weighs heavily - and negatively - in any decision to 
deregulate the economy." 
FE ER adds that, according to local businessmen, data on 
the Suharto family is "just the tip of the iceberg and 
that attention should be focussed on what the offspring 
of government ministers are doing in business." 
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More debts for a debt-ridden economy 
The sum total of the Indonesian government's foreign debt 
is now said to be $30 billion or, according to some 
sources, $32 billion, plus about $7 billion of debts owed 
by the private sector. Meanwhile, the debt service ratio 
which measures the amount paid out for interest and the 
repayment of principle as a proportion of foreign 
exchange earnings is fast approaching 40 per cent, well 
above the World Bank's danger threshold of 20 per cent. 
Yet, the military regime has pronounced itself to be 
set against asking its creditors to reschedule its 
enormous repayment load for fear of damaging its credit-
worthiness. lt has decided instead to seek even more 
debts in an attempt to extricate itself from its current· 
economic malaise. In the past two months, it has 
negol'iated loans of $300 million from the World Bank and 
$900 million from the Japanese Exim Bank, in addition t·o 
a syndicated, commercial loan of $350 million from 
foreign, mainly Japonese, banks which was negotiated in 
the closing months of 1986. 
The World Bank loon 
The World Bank loan is a described as a trade policy 
loan. Unlike past World Bank loans, it is not tied to any 
project but is for the purpose of covering Indonesia's 
bc1lance of payments crisis as the country attempts to 
adjust to the drnstic fall in its earnings from oil. 
Normally such a loan would be made available only by the 
International Monetary Fund. The loan wiJl be available 
for immediate use and is granted on less concessionary 
conditions (faster repayment terms and higher interest) 
than- all previo11s Bank loans lo Indonesia. 
The loan is basically a reward to Indonesia for the 
punishing 45 per cent devaluation of the rupiah in 
September 1986 and the tough budget announced by General 
Suharto at the beginning of 1987. Other countries might· 
expect widespread political unrest to follow such severe 
economic retrenchment but Suharto's repressive system of 
political control has made this almost impossible, at 
least in the short term. 
As an indication of the crisis now engulfing the 
Indonesian economy, this type of World Bank loan has 
previously been reserved only for low-achievement 
economies in Africa and certainly not for economies that 
enjoyed the benefits of the oil boom. 
The Indonesian government is also currently negotiating 
a standby loan from the International Monetary Fund under 
its compensatory fund facility, normally reserved for 
non-oil producing countries suffering from worsening 
terms of trade. Again, Indonesia stands out as a 
significant exception to the rule. 
The Japanese Exi rn Bank loun 
The Japanese Exim Bank decision to grant· Indonesia a 
special loan of $900mi11 ion aroused much more comment 
than the World Bank loan. This is the first time, it is 
repeatedly stressed, that Japan has approved a loan to 
any country that is not tied to promoting Japanese 
exports. The loan is to be converted by the Indonesian 
government into rupiahs, for counterpart funding for 
World Bank projects which would otherwise have to be 
abandoned or postponed indefinitely for lack of rupiahs. 
Altogether twenty-one projects will be supported. The 
projects have been selected by the Japanese for their 
capital-intensive bias and include projects in 
agriculture, communications, rood- and dam-building, 
plantations and electricity. It is not unlikely that 
transmigration projects, which are known to be faltering 
because of lack of rupiahs, are included. 
This loan will boost overall Japanese credit to 
Indonesia by about 20 per cent, from $4.6 billion to $5.5 
billion. Japan is, in any case, Indonesia's largest 
bilateral creditor. Commentators point out that the loan 
directly serves the Exim Bank's own interests as 
Indonesia is the Bank's largest client and it is well 
aware of the repercussions for its own prospects if the 
Indonesian economy were allowed to go under. 
For well over a year, Indonesia has been unable to 
proceed with many of the projects funded by the World 
Bank or indeed by other sources of credit because it 
lacks rupiahs to fund the domestic costs. This is the 
result of the sharp fall in state revenue, forcing a 
drastic cutback in the level of government investment, as 
envisaged in the budget announced last January. Efforts 
to convince Japan to provide this special loan began in 
mid 1986. The loan agreement is expected to encourage 
other member-states of the Inter-Governmental Group on 
Indonesia to provide more untied loons when it meets in 
The Hague on 17 -18 June to consider the 1987 handout by 
western states to keep the Indonesian economy afloat. 
These latest foreign loans wi 11 increase Indonesia's 
overall indebtedness by more than the amounts directly 
involved as they will bring into operation projects 
currently not being built, for which the foreign credit 
hos been agreed in principle but not yet disbursed. 
Embassy visits to Irion Joya 
obstructed 
The Japanese, Austral ion and Canadian embassies in 
Jakarta have oil faced delays and difficulties in 
sending missions to Irion Jayo (West Papua). UPI [19 
February] reported that diplomats expressed "surprise 
and anger" at an apparent clampdown on travel to the 
province. "Maybe they're getting nervous with the 
election coming up," one diplomat said. 
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The IGGI and Indonesia's poor 
correspondent in Jakarta. 
~~~-;:-".".""~-==""'iiiiPiiim~~77~ 
As I write, Piet Bukmon, the chairman of the IGGI (lnter-
Governmentol Group on Indonesia) hos just met our 
economic affairs ministers. He met Mr President too who 
told him a lot though we con be sure he heard nothing 
about the hardships of Indonesians impoverished by all 
the corruption. Nor will he hove heard stories such as I 
will tell you because the IGGI exists to help those in 
power, not the common people. 
Government leaders in the advanced countries pose as 
champions of human rights, yet they preserve regimes that 
trample human rights underfoot as long as their economic 
and political interests ore protected. Mr Bukmon visited 
IGGI and Dutch projects, and left Indonesia feeling 
satisfied because the government hos stuck by its resolve 
not to have a deficit budget even though the debt-service 
ratio now stands at 33.2 per cent. Even though Indonesia 
must repay Rp 6,800 trillion in the current financial 
year, the government w i lJ not seek any reschedu Ii ng of 
these repayments. Foreign credit hos become the decisive 
factor for Indonesian development, such is the IGGl's 
success in creating a generation of debtors, o generation 
whose fate is now at the mercy of the IGGI and similar 
institutions. 
History shows that powerless people who kneel before 
their colonisers con rise in anger once their innermost 
feelings explode. The advanced countries must shore 
responsibi 1 ity for creating this sense of outrage and 
revenge, for foiling to heed the feelings of the people. 
They ore seriously mistaken to regard our parliament (the 
DPR) as the voice of the Indonesian people. When the 
President told the DPR on 7 January that the pay of 
government employees would not go up, the Members 
octuall y applauded. Does this represent the views of 
government employees? 
The western powers are making a serious mis take to 
regard the dozens of clandestine communist groups, the 
Unemployed workers from 
Cokung-Cil incing waiting for 
trucks to dump garbage. They 
try to make a living from 
recycling garbage from local 
factories. [Jakarta Post, 17 
March 1987] This is the 
very location of the report 
from our special 
correspondent. 
hundreds of clandestine Muslim and patriotic nationalist 
groups now in existence as being of no consequence. Only 
recently, the commander of Kopkamtib, the security 
forces, admitted that nine tons of books and documents 
were confiscated in 1986, but what he didn't soy was how 
much more was not confiscated. 
Finding alternatives 
Despite all the boosts of the government about its 
development programme and despite the mounting debts, 
unemployment has worsened, purchasing power has fol len, 
industry and agriculture have been hit hard and people 
are being laid off. 
In early 1986, hundreds of workers on the Jakarta 
Industrial Estate Pulogodung (JIEP) were socked. Two 
hundred of them live in a kampung near the estate. Living 
so close together, they shared each others' hardships. 
No- one had any savings or anything valuable to sell. 
Most were casual workers and had received no severance 
pay. So, what next? The kompung got grubbier, the 
children got hungrier and many fell i 11 though their 
parents could not afford to buy medicine. 
When their efforts to find other jobs foiled, the two 
hundred socked JI E P workers remembered that they used to 
have to shift garbage from the factories on the estate to 
dumps nearby. A lot of this garbage was still usable; 
cardboard, plastic sheets, pieces of aluminium, steel 
pipes and, lost but not least, empty lubricating oil 
drums. These piles of garbage gave them new hope. Here 
was something they could do together, sharing the same 
fate, creating a new livelihood. 
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Fighting for control 
The garbage had been pi I ing up for years. A dozen or so 
workers had started making a living collecting the 
garbage but they were few in number so no-one paid much 
attention. But when two hundred people became involved, 
things got very lively. As they started collecting and 
cleaning up hundreds of empty lubricating oil drums and 
selling the dregs as fuel, their incomes soared. They 
were each able to earn as much as Rp 5,000 a day, or 
about $3.00, much more than they earned as factory 
workers. 
Gradually, conditions in the kampung improved, children 
started playing again, the smel I of cooking spices fi I led 
the air and pots were boiling on the cooking stoves. 
After months of desperation, there was an atmosphere of 
hope. The piles of garbage would last for at least 
another six months. 
But, as the proverb says, where there are ants, there 
must be sugar. A local businessman, an Indonesian citizen 
of Chinese extraction, who hod been buying the re-cycled 
fuel from the kampung people and paying them about Rp 
1,500,000 a day for it began to think: Why can't I handle 
the fuel myself? So, he worked out a strategy. First, he 
cut down the amount he bought, then he pushed the price 
down. His next step was to get the collaboration of the 
local military command, the Koramil. 
/.\long came the Korami I with all kinds of pretexts and 
took control of the removal of the garbage. People were 
ordered to stop taking rubbish in or out, in particular 
oil. At first, some of them tried to sneak in but the 
Koromil took firm action, terrorising the people. Some 
were arrested and accused as the ones responsible, or 
accused of holding illegal meetings, or predictably, 
accused of being communist remnants. 
In the end, the Koram i l's real purpose became clear. 
The people were told they could collect the oil but only 
on condition that they sold it to a trader approved by 
the army and at a price fixed by the buyer. At first, 
these conditions were rejected but the people were 
powerless and their need for a I iving desperate. They 
turned to the local pastor for help. The church was upset 
anyway because many of its members ore Chinese-born 
citizens. The people in the kampung vented their fury on 
the Chinese businessman, not on the Koramil who, they 
believed, had just been used as a tool. 
Politics enters the scene 
The church became more agitated when it was discovered 
that one of the people involved in resisting the Chinese 
businessman was from a group that had been involved in 
the Cicendo incident in Bandung when Muslims attacked a 
police station in Morch 1983. The local military 
commander soon got wind of this but before he could set 
his troops on the man's trail, he fled and went into 
hiding, toking with him several of the former factory 
workers who had never done anything political but were 
now political fugitives. And the church became involved 
in looking after the families of the men now in hiding. 
In such a sequence of events - lay-offs caused by the 
recession, people trying to make a living from re-cycled 
garbage and ending up as political fugitives - who is to 
blame? 
The events in Cakung-Ci lincing ore instructive. They 
show how ordinary people became militant activists simply 
because they did something to make a living. And the 
whole thing started not· because of any subversive groups 
getting involved but because a corrupt businessman 
created the conditions for organised resistance. People 
are not really interested in whether corrupt government 
ECONOMICS 
officials are the favoured sons of someone or other, or 
the pure creatures of capitalism. People will find a 
million and one ways to stand up to a corrupt government, 
starting from small, silent, sporadic deeds. There is 
nothing unusual about that. 
Living conditions in Indonesia will not get better in 
1987 /88 even if the IGG I provides more credit. The 
people's movement will grow in step with the worsening 
national economy as the 1980s draw to a close. This is a 
decisive decade for the Suharto regime. 
I Morch 1987 
New IGGI chairman visits Indonesia 
Piet Bukmon, the new Dutch minister for Development Aid, 
made his first visit to Indonesia at the end of February. 
In this ministerial post, he automatically becomes 
chairman of the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia, 
the international aid consortium which meets annually lo 
decide how much multilateral and bilateral aid will be 
allocated to Indonesia. 
Bukmon was formerly chairman of the CDA, the party of 
the Christian Democrats, now the leading party in 
Holland's coalition government. He has a reputation as an 
extreme rightwing politician and had no connections with 
or interest in Third World affairs until he became 
development minister a few months ago. His inexperience 
might explain why he moved cautiously during his visit, 
unlike his predecessor, the hii:th profile Mrs Schoo. 
BeforeleavingHolland, Bu km an made it clear that human 
rights and the East Timor question were not on his 
aqenda. For the past few years, Dutch i:1overnments have 
rigidly refused to make any connection between foreign 
aid and human rii:1hts, particularly as rei:1ards Indonesia. 
Although he gave no hint of whether the lGGI would this 
year grant Indonesia as much as it did lost year, just 
over $2,500 million, he mode it clear that he would press 
other IGGI members to allow more of their aid to be 
converted into rupiahs, to help with the domestic funding 
of projects. He also stressed that the IGGI would support 
the Indonesian economy as long as necessary. 
He announced that Dutch aid to Indonesia this year 
would increase to Nfl 232 million ($113.2 million) from 
Nfl 179 million, an increase of over 35 per cent. 
The leading member of the IGGI is the World Bank which 
provides the framework for decisions each year. The 
member states are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Fronce, Germany, Italy, Japon. Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Spain, Switzerland, the UK and the USA. Finland attends 
IGGI meetings as an observer. 
426 pages 
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The screw tightens on hundreds of organisations 
In June this year, the authoritarian and repressive 
provisions of the Societies Law enacted in June 1985 come 
into force, giving the government unlimited powers to 
suspend and ban organisations for threatening national 
security or for committing numerous other political 
offences. 
The Societies Law was one of five political laws pushed 
through parliament in 1985 making it obligatory for all 
political parties and social organisations to adopt the 
state ideology of Pancasilo as their sole ideology and 
abandon all other principles. Up till now, the main 
emphasis of the regime has been on bringing the political 
parties into line and stage-managing the 1987 general 
elections under the new political rules. Once the 
elections are out of the way, attention will be directed 
towards enforcing complete compliance by all other 
organisations. It is certain that many organisations such 
as 1legal aid institutes and environmental groups will 
find themselves under extreme government scrutiny and 
control. 
The Societies Law provided for a transitional period of 
two years during which all organisations were required to 
comply with the provisions of the Law. That period 
expires on 7 June 1987. In preparation for the new phase 
of social control, the government last year issued its 
i mplementary regulation for the 1985 Societies Law. 
The Law applies to literally every kind of 
organisation: political parties and organisations 
formally associated with them (such formal associations 
will no longer be allowed), sectional organisations like 
trade unions and women's organisations, professional 
organisations of doctors, lawyers, engineers and the 
like, single-issue organsations concerned with the 
environment, population, legal justice and so on, and 
cultural and recreational organisations. 
Regimenting social organisations 
We summarise below the most important provisions of 
lmplementary Regulation No 18, April 1986, based on the 
full text reproduced in Indonesia Reports - Political 
Supplement, No 20, February 1987: 
* Al 1 organisations must report their existence to the 
government. (Article 2). 
* All organisations are required by law to have statutes 
and to include Pancasila as their sole principle. It is 
impermissible to include other terms such as basis, 
foundation, basic orientation or other words obscuring 
the sense of this principle. (Article 3). 
* Al 1 organisations are obliged to "do their utmost" to 
make members undergo Pancasila indoctrination courses 
known as P4. They must also preserve national unity by 
putting national interests above individual and group 
interests. (Article 6) 
• The arrangements of organisations, their signboards and 
symbols are all subject to regulation by the Ministel' of 
the Interior. (Articles 10 and 11) 
* All financial and other kinds of help trom abroad must 
have government permission. (Articles 12, 18 and 20) 
• Organisations may not give aid to foreign parties which 
Home Affairs Minister, General Supardjo Rustam, in 
Parliament after the Societies Law was passed. [Tempo, 8 
June 1985] 
is harmful to national interests. (Articles 18 and 21) 
* The government shall undertake guidance of all 
organisations in the form of "counselling" (this includes 
giving proposals, guidelines, direction, advice, 
education and so on) and "safeguarding" by means of 
protecting an organisation's right in accordance with the 
laws and regulations. 
* Organisations will be required to become part of a 
single ''Vehicle for guidance", in other words to fuse or 
merge with other organisations of the same sort so as, in 
the words of the Elucidation to the original Law, "to 
facilitate matters for the government in providing 
counselling etc". (Article 14) 
• "General guidance" is conducted by the Minister of the 
Interior while "technical guidance" is undertaken by 
ministers or other government officials responsible for 
the field of activity in which the organisation ls 
engaged. (Articles 15 and 16) 
Suspension and dissolution 
• Organisations which disturb security and public order 
and/or accept help from abroad without government 
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approval or give aid to foreign parties, ore liable to be 
suspended. "Disturbing security and public order" 
includes undermining notional unity, discrediting the 
government, obstructing development, and any other 
activities that disturb political stability. (Article 19) 
* If the organisation persists, it will be liable to 
dissolution. (Articles 25 and 26) Organisations spreading 
Marxism and other ideologies and teachings contrary to 
Pancasila will be dissolved. {Article 27) After 
dissolution, the organisation will be declared a banned 
organisation. 
* All existing organisations must bring themselves into 
line with the Low by 7 June 1987. If they fail to do so, 
they will be dissolved. (Article 28) 
* 
The lmplementary Regulation makes no provision for 
organisations to appeal against arbitrary suspension or 
dissolution by a minister. The only "concession" mode by 
the executive when the original bill was under discussion 
in 1985 was that before going ahead with a decision to 
suspend or dissolve, the opinion of the Supreme Court or 
other authoritative agencies may be sought. 
Legal Aid Institute criticisms 
In its testimony submitted to parliament in 1985 when the 
societies bill was still ,under discussion, the Indonesian 
Legal Aid Institutes Foundation (YLBH I) bitterly 
criticised the new law, decribing it as a move towards 
regimentation. [The text of the testimony was published 
in Indonesia Reports - Human Rights Supplement, No. 20, 
February 1987.) It foresaw that the implementary 
regulation would extinguish the freedom and creativity of 
social organisations, leading them to carry out self-
censorship to avoid being banned. 
[Needless to say, this has already happened. Legal aid 
institutes are already for less disposed to taking 
actions or making statements which can be interpreted as 
"political". Likewise, environmentalist organisations 
have shown great circumspection in becoming publicly 
involved, for instance, in the widespread criticism of 
the government's transmigration programme.] 
The YLBH I characterised the law as "the expansion of 
government authority ... to nullify the right to exist of 
social organisations regarded as threatening the existing 
socio-political order or acting to spread ideologies 
other than the dominant one". 
It attacks in particular the government's insistence on 
controlling all assistance from abroad. "It should 
suffice to require a public financial report audited by 
an accountant." If government permission is required, 
this means "that social ••. organisations will be 
Increasingly strongly suspected, co~t~olled and 
supervised. And this could be the beg1nnang of the 
extinguishing of our freedQm and creativity". 
----
HUMAN RIGHTS 
International lawyers refused entry 
An international mission of lawyers appointed by the 
Paris-based International League for Human Rights to 
investigate the situation of Indonesian political 
prisoners, in particular those now under death sentence, 
was refused visas by the Indonesian government at the 
last moment. The decl sion to send the mission had been 
prompted by the executions of political prisoners in 
Indonesia in 1985 and 1986. 1 
The mission was to hove included the League's general-
secretary, Etienne Jaudel, a British lawyer, David 
Hallmark, Professor Chamari of the University of Tunis 
and an Australian lawyer. 
Initially, M. Etienne Jaudel was granted a visa to 
visit Indonesia for the purposes of the mission by the 
Indonesian embassy in Paris. The mission was to hove left 
for Indonesia on 7 January but David Hallmark was refused 
a visa. When M. Jaudel wrote to the embassy saying the 
date was being postponed because other members had been 
refused visas, he was told that he too would not now be 
permitted to go ahead with the mission. The embassy 
accused the League of wanting "to engage in unfriendly 
activity or to interfere in {Indonesia's) internal 
affairs". 
In reply, M. Jaudel said the mission "would h~ve 
listened objectively to the arguments the Indonesian 
government would have put forward in justification for 
continuing to execute detainees more than twenty years 
after they had been condemned by special courts". 
Violating the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
In a press statement issued In Paris on 20 January, the 
International League noted that "several dozen people are 
at present detained in Indonesia who are former members 
of the Indonesian Communist Party and who were condemned 
to death by military tribunals in circumstances that 
appear to contravene the right to a fair tr.ial as 
recognised in Articles 10 and 11 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights". It said that "carrying out 
death sentences more than twenty years after they were 
pronounced amounts to cruel, Inhuman and degrading 
treatment prohibited under Article 7 of the Declaration". 
It coiled on the United Nations, the Council of Europe 
and UNESCO with which it has consultative status "to Y"orn 
General Suharto's government of the political and moral 
damage which could result from further executions of 
political prisoners in such abnormal circumstances" .. It 
urged them to intercede in favour of a comprehensive 
amnesty for all those who continue to be detained because 
of the 1965 events, and in favour of the abrogation of 
the special laws applied since that date, before the 
general elections which are due to take place next 
April". 
The International League for Human Rights was set up at 
the beginning of the century in respons.e to the notori~us 
Dreyfus case in France and has established a repu~a!1on 
for sending impartial missions to observe pol1tacal 
trials and examine judicial handling of political coses 
in a number of countries. 
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~ M-~~LI~ TRIALS __ _ ~ 
More usroh sentences in Central Java 
Fol lowingaccusationsby the former military commander of 
Central Java, Major General (now Lieutenant-General) 
Hartas Harsudiono, that usroh activities hod spread to 
the north of the province, the mosques in the harbour 
city of Semarang hove been under close survei llonce by 
the security forces. 
The usroh movement is a grassroots Muslim movement 
centred in the south of Central Java. It advocates a 
return to piety and organises its adherents in small, 
home-based groups. [For an assessment of the movement, 
see T APOL Bulletin, No 79, February 1987] 
Meanwhile trials of alleged usroh activists hove 
continued in many Central Java towns. From the sketchy 
reports appearing in the regional press, it appears that 
the trials continue to attract large crowds. Since 
January 1987, trials have been under way in Magelong, 
Banymos, Karanganyor, Bontul, Brebes and Jogjakarta. 
In many of the trials, the prosecution hos called 
witnesses who are themselves under detention and are 
clearly sympathetic to the defence. This could mean that 
more trials will follow, but it could also mean that one 
person is being tried to set on example and to prove the 
regime's political charges against usroh. 
Five-year sentence in Bantul 
Suyud, 25 years, on employee of the Public Works 
Department (identified initially as Sy bin R), got five 
years for sermons in June and July 1985 criticising the 
government's programme and calling for the Pancasila and 
the 1945 Constitution to be replaced by the Quran and the 
Hadith, the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad. The 
defendant was accused of opposing the family planning 
programme and the involvement of mole doctors in 
adm ini st er ing controcept i ves. 
Another charge was that he possessed copies of banned 
publications like Al-Ikhwon (o Jogjakarta publication 
whose editor is now serving o 13-yeor sentence) and Al-
Furqon. [This is the first time there hos been any 
mention of the lotter publication. The name means the 
"dividing-line between right and wrong"] Al-lkhwan was 
banned by the Attorney General in Moy 1985. 
The prosecution had demanded o sentence of 15 years and 
is likely to appeal against the court's 'lenient' 
verdict. A number of witnesses at this trial could well 
face indictment soon. [Kedoulatan Rakyat, 5, 8 January 
and 26 February, and Kompas, 28 February] 
Karanganyar and Jogjakarta 
Budiman al Solihin, 29 years, who works in o bicycle 
repair shop, was sentenced to 4 years at the Karanganyar 
district court on 31 January for attending an usroh 
course at the Al-lmron mosque in Kale village, Tasikmadu. 
Since many witnesses in the trial appeared to be in 
sympathy with the accused, it is likely that more trials 
will follow [Suara Merdeka, 27 January and 2 March]. 
Margono bin Syafei, 47, o toi lor from the vii loge of 
Janturan, Umbulhor jo, near Jogjakarta, was sentenced to 
three years in late January. He was accused of 
distributing copies of Al-Ikhwan and of membership of the 
usroh movement. The court decided that Margono's 
involvement in usroh was unproven, but distribution of a 
banned publication alone warranted keeping him behind 
bars for three years [Kedaulotan Rakyat, 30 January and 
Kompos, 31 January J. 
M. Suborin Syakur, o 27..:yeor old university student 
from Gambiron, also in Umbulharjo, was sentenced to no 
less than eight years in the Jogjakarta district court 
for subversion connected with usroh activities. He 
allegedly organised 'training sessions' for groups of 
fl fty people at various mosques in Jogjakarta and 
religious schools ir1 K laten. Copies of Al-lkhwan were 
found in his possession. 
He refused to accept the services of o lawyer and told 
the court his sermons hod been concerned solely with the 
teachings of the Prophet Mohammad. Witnesses confirmed 
this but the court nevertheless gave him one of the 
harshest sentences passed against usroh defendants [Suora 
Merdeka, 22 January]. 
Brebes and Banyumas 
Several Brebes trials are under way, as reported in 
TAPOL Bulletin No 79 and sentences were expected in mid 
March. The prosecutor hos asked for 15-yeor sentences 
against three defendants, Abdullah Somari, 27, 'G', 21, 
and 'R', 23. All were said to hove recruited people to 
attend usroh training sessions in Brebes. 
Evidence in court suggested that usroh courses in 
Brebes were very well attended by high-school pupils. 
While some witnesses spoke badly of their sermons, others 
said they hod only touched on various aspects of Islamic 
teachings concerning fasting, socio) welfare and so on. 
Other trials in Brebes still only identify the 
defendants by their initials. One is A.R (referred to in 
our last Bulletin as A.G.). Three others on trial, not 
previously mentioned, are identified as l.J., W and U. 
The court sessions have drawn such huge crowds of 
school pupils that the local education department hos 
issued on order requiring pupils to obtain permission 
Machmud Yusuf Ambori during his trial in Tasikmalaya. 
[Tempo, 31 January 1987] 
12 TAPOL Bulletin No. 80, April 1937 
from their head-teachers before attending trials. [Suara 
Merdeka, 5 and 30 January, and 3 March) 
The first usroh trial in Banyumas is against M.Z., 25 
years, a Gajah Mada University student from Sidamulya 
village in Banyumas. M.Z. is clearly very popular. 
Reports from the trial suggest that he gave unauthorised 
religious lessons to pupils of a nearby madrasah (Islamic 
school). Bored by their madrasah teachers, the pupils 
played truant so as to attend the much more interesting 
and colourful lessons given by M.Z. 
A close colleague of M.Z. identified as Arif is said to 
be in hiding while two others, Fu, 21, and Sim, 23 who 
were have appeared as witnesses hove "disappeared''. 
The large crowds attending his trial suggest that his 
incarceration has not diminished his attraction as a 
local figure. 
A furious argument broke out in court between the 
defendant and two 'expert' witnesses from the Deportment 
of Religious Affairs. On 9 Morch, the prosecutor asked 
the court to pass a sentence of eighteen years. 
[Kedoulaton Rakyat, 7, 12, 25 and 26 February, and 
Kompas, 11 March. 
Other Muslim trials 
Achmad Zaini, 22, a shrimp trader and teacher of 
religion, was sentenced in January in the district court 
of Mungkid, near Magelang, Central Java, for displaying 
copies of Ar-Risalahand Al-lkhwan. He was arrested after 
asking two of his pupils to display copies of the banned 
publications on a mosque notice-board. He told the court 
he received the publications from a friend in Jogjakarta 
and hod no idea they were banned, 
It is evident that the security forces treat these 
publications with the same severity as they treat Marxist 
publications. 
Muslim preacher sentenced in West Java 
Machmud Yusuf Ambari, 44, hos been found gui I ty of 
subversion and sentenced to three-and-a-half years for 
sermons he gave in July and September 1984, calling on 
Muslims to hove the courage to stand up to the government 
authorities and not accept any doctrines other than 
Islam. The defendant is a well-known local preacher and 
teacher of religion and formerly represented the ex-
MUSLIM TRIALS ______ - _l 
Muslim party, the PPP, in the Gorut assembly. 
According to the indictment, the accused said in a 
sermon that · Pancasila was deficient as a religious 
doctrine as it had no prophet of its own. He soi d 
Pancasila indoctrination courses should be stopped. 
As with many preachers tried in Jakarta in the last two 
years, Machmud Yusuf's sermons were recorded by army 
spies. The prosecutor called seventeen witnesses to 
testify against him, most of them military police and 
civilian officials who hod made casettes of his sermons. 
The defendant said oil his sermons had been duly licenced 
and supervised by the authorities. He was previously 
arrested in 1982 on charges connected with the 'Komando 
Jihad' but was later released for lock of evidence. 
[Tempo, 31 January, Pikiron Rakyat, 27 January and 
Kompas, 28 January] 
Trials in Malang, East Java 
Several verdicts have been passed against alleged 
members of an organisation said to be called Jamooh 
Mujahidin/Komondo Jihad. This is a new name in the 
regime's lexicon of subversive threats. The existence of 
the Komondo Jihad has never been convincingly proven so 
whether this new name is any more reliable remains to be 
seen. 
In separate trials before the Molong district court, 
Mochammad Socheh, 25, and Imam Ism iarto, 26, were found 
guilty of subversion for wanting to replace Pancasilo and 
the 1945 Constitution. Both defendants hod been in 
detention for four years when their trials commenced, and 
were sentenced to five years each [ Kompas, 28 January). 
Socheh, a tailor, was charged with concealing a Komando 
Jihad member named A. Muchsar who is already serving a 
10-year sentence. In earlier sessions of his trial, two 
witnesses appeared, both said to be from the Komondo 
Jihad. One was Idris, already serving a 14-year sentence, 
and the other was Rosmin Ansori who Is serving ten years. 
All these sentences were passed in 1979. 
This is the first time these names have emerged and 
reveal that many more Muslim trials have occurred since 
the late 1970s than those included in T APOL 's monitoring. 
Indonesia: Musli111s on trial 
Published by: TAPOL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign 
Since early 1985, more than 150 Muslims have been tried, convicted and sentenced to heavy 
temlS of imprisonment in Indonesia for giving public sermons critical of the government, 
conducting religious courses not approved by the authorities, or producing leaflets or 
journals that denolUlce government policy. Some were held responsible for bombing 
incidents that were never properly investigated. 
The trials followed the army's crackdown on a demonstration of Muslims in September 
1984. Dozens, possibly even hundreds, were killed when troops opened fire on the unarmed 
crowd. The trials took place at a time of deep disquiet in Indonesia about the military 
government's imposition of total ideological conformity, preventing organisations from 
proclaiming Islamic or other religious principles. 
Indonesia: Musllms OD trial analyses the trials, placing them in the context of the 
continuing conflict between Indonesia's Muslims and the military regime. 
'The first genuine attempt in the West to focus on the oppress.ion of Muslims in a state 
that is more than 90 per cerit Muslim, by a regime committed to establishing W estem norms 
and values. The conflict between the political culture of the Muslim masses and their rulers 
is brought out vividly in Indonesia: Musllms OD trial. Although it focuses on events in 
Indonesia, this study will help one understand why Muslim nation states are inherently 
lUlStable and are mvariably held together by oppression." 
Dr. M. Gbayasuddln, Editor, Musllmedla 
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A new term has entered tne vocaoulary of lndones10 1s 
military regime - disiplin nasional. It was tirst coined 
by the leader himself, General Suharto, and was formally 
launched at an army seminar lost August. Army seminars 
are infrequent and highly secretive affairs, where 
notional political strategies are worked out and the 
notion's political agenda for the coming period .is set. 
F ri:>m the very sketchy reports that emerged at the time, 
it is clear that the August 1986 seminar and the annual 
Armed Forces Leadership meeting held immediately 
afterwards decided that the only way to safeguard the 
regime's programme in o time of grove economic crisis was 
to create a culture of discipline. It was now time for 
the entire population t·o emulate the discipline required 
from al 1 members of the or med forces. 
The theme was token up at a seminar convened in 
February this year by the Bandung Teachers Training 
College attended by educationalists, industrial relations 
specialists, psychologists and a number of senior army 
officers. In the words of General Benny Murdani, armed 
forces commander-in-chief, who gave the opening address, 
"the success of national development is vital to our 
survival as a nation, but without national discipline, 
that success cannot be assured". The seminar was asked to 
find ways to persuade Indonesians "to adopt a more 
disciplined way of life both in their professional 
occupations and in their dai 1 y 1 ives" [Jakarta Post, 26 
February]. 
Such language has a sinister ring to anyone familiar 
with the political culture nurtured by the national 
socialists in Germany and Italy. But in the case of 
Indonesia, it is more appropriate to refer to the deep 
and abiding impact of Japanese militarism on the 
Indonesian army during the Japanese occupation from 1942 
to 1945. It is no coincidence that the army has recently 
announced plans to publish a book to honour the tradition 
and history of Peta [Pembela TonohoirL Defenders of the 
Motherland, the mi Ii ti a created by the Japanese in 1943. 
Peta was the breeding ground of Indonesian militarism 
where most Indonesian generals ot the helm of the New 
Order regime since 1965, including Suharto, gained their 
military and ideological training. 
Flag ceremonies and push-ups 
There has long been a tradition in offices and schools 
for ceremonies to be held at which the notional flag is 
honoured, sometimes on the seventeenth day of each month 
or more often every Monday morning. 
But it was the Rector of Riau University who had the 
novel idea of punishing a hundred members of staff for 
failing to attend the ceremony several times. They were 
required to take part in a run round the campus, watched 
by students and members of staff. "This wil 1 shame them 
into not repeating their mistake," said Professor Dr H. 
M'uchtar Lufti. Now, we would not claim to know whether 
this rector is from the army or just an 'ordinary' 
civilian. Either way, the signs are ominous. 
Indeed, some military commanders seem to be positively 
embarrassed by the "overkill" of zealous bureaucrats and 
school-heads. The m ilitory commander of Central Java 
actually complained that schools in the province are 
requiring their pupi Is to honour the national flag every 
ti me they enter and leave the classroom. Such practices, 
he said, "could have a negative impact" [Sinor Harapan, 
12 September]. 
From other parts of the country come reports that 
employees who turn up late for work or fai 1 to attend the 
weekly flag-raising ceremonies are required to do push-
ups and other forms of physical punishment. 
No Pancasila certificates 
for ex-communists and prostitutes 
The man in charge of Indonesia's programme of 
indoctrination has officially declared that prostitutes, 
convicts and former communist political prisoners ore not 
fit to be issued with certificates confirming that they 
have successfully concluded o course in Pancasilo. 
General Sarwo Edhie won notoriety as the man who 
launched the first mass k ii lings of communist suspects in 
Central Java in October 1965, and later os commander of 
the military and intelligence operation In West Papua in 
1969 causing many casualties. Today, the general heads 
the state institute known as BP7 which is responsible for 
indoctrinating the population. 
Under rules adopted in 1983, all citizens are required 
to attend Pancasila (P4) courses. The courses vary in 
intensity. People in the higher echelons must attend a 
two-week course and do a paper at the end in order to 
qualify for the certificate. The demands on 'commoners' 
are less arduous for they need only attend a 40-hour 
course. In the pyramid-shaped programme designed by Sorwo 
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A BP7 postcard advocates the good life, Pancasila-style. 
Above: With the nation, state, society and self-control. 
Below: Please no gamblers, prostitutes, robbers drug 
addicts and drinkers. ' 
14 T APOL Bulletin No. 80, April 1987 
General Sarwo Edhie, a model of Pancasila excellence. 
--
HUMAN RIGHTS 
~-- -- - - ------------~~-~ 
Edhie, it is now the lower echelons who are the target. 
But it recently came to the attention of this upright 
and crusading general that prostitutes who have taken P4 
courses are displaying their certificates on their 
premises. In Semarang, 1,200 prostitutes have already 
received P4 certificates. Such things must not be allowed 
to continue, he told a P4 course of women from the 
official women's organisation, Dharma Wanita (Jakarta 
Post, 3 March]. This organisation hod apparently thought 
it could contribute to the drive for ideological purity 
by encouraging prostitutes to "mend their ways" through 
Pancosila enlightenment. 
The general used the occasion to re-affirm that two 
other categories of people must also be excluded from the 
new enlightenment - ex-communist prisoners and convicts. 
There must be a lot people who are secretly relieved ot 
this welcome exclusion from the obligatory courses! 
Restore campus democracy, says former minister 
A former Minister for l~eligious Affairs, Dr. Mukti Ali, 
has called for the restoration of organisational and 
political rights on university campuses and for a 
reversal of the clampdown on student organisations 
launched in 1978 in response to the student protest 
movement of that year. 
Dr Mukti Ali was Minister for Religious Affairs from 
1971to1978, an unusually liberal-minded scholar to have 
been given a position by Suharto. He is from the 
Muhammadiyah and is now rector of the Sunan Kalijaga 
State Islamic College (IAIN) in Jogjakarta. In 1978, he 
was replaced as minister by General Alamsjah 
Prow i ranegac a. 
He attacked both the NKK or Normalisation of Campus 
Life imposed by the government in 1978 and the SKS or 
Semester Credit System intr9duced later, which hove 
t·ogether completely paralysed organised student activity 
on the campuses. "The time has come for student 
organisations to be revived so that students can speak. 
Students must not be silent because silence is obnoxious" 
[ Kompos, 27 February 1987). 
The NKK led to the dissolutlon of democratically 
elected student councils and placed all student bodies 
under the supervision and tutelage of the university 
rector. The SKS imposes rigid requirements on students' 
ar.adernic achievement making it virtually impossibl'! for 
them to engage in any extra-mural activity. 
Or Mukt i so id some people are sti II afraid of ollowi ng 
studenls to engage in politics. ''Yet politics regulates 
us oil and if we don'! engage in politics, other will 
impose their polit-ics on us." 
Students forced to aUend Golkar campus meetings 
Dr Mukti's warning of politicking on the campuses could 
hardly hove been better confirmed than by a tour of 
universities at around the some time by retired General 
Sudharmono, chairman of the government party, Golkor, as 
part of Golkor's election campaigning. [Although the 
campaigning period is not officially allowed to start 
until 24 Morch, Sudhormono hos been touring the country 
for many months, drumming up support for his party.] 
Despite the ban on political activity Ol1 campuses since 
1978, Sudharmono's meetings took place without hindrance. 
Jn fact, attendance was obligatory [Tempo, 7 March 1987}. 
Although the 2,000 st·udents at his meeting at Pojojoron 
University in Bandung are said to have cheered when he 
boasted of Golkar's role in irnposing Poncasila as the 
sole ideology, Tempo also reported that students at his 
meeting in Diponegoro University, Semarang challenged 
this intrusion of Golkar campaigning on their campus. The 
weekly did not give details of lhe complaints. 
Golkar's General Secretory, Sarwono Kusumaatmaja, in 
response to Dr Mukti's call, said students must complete 
their studies before having anything to do with politics. 
Sorwono was himself in the forefront of student politics 
in Hie late 19605 on the side of the army's takeover of 
power. He said there was no question of student 
government on campus being restored, claiming that "even 
the most 1 iberol country" would not buy the idea [Jakarta 
Post, 7 Morch]. 
HMI supports Mukti's call 
The Muslim students organisation, HMI hos supported the 
call for the revival of student organisations and 
att"ocked the institutionalised role of university rectors 
who now supervise all activities on campus. Although the 
Tebak: Apanya yang samaf 
Can you see in what way they are all alike? LTempo, 7 
March 1987] 
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HMI spoke about the need to re-establish democratic 
institutions on campus, neither they nor others who hove 
welcomed Dr Mukti's statement have dared point out that 
the Societies Law blocks the re-emergence of democratic 
organisations not only on campus but throughout society. 
Student demonstrations broken up 
There are signs of a revival in sf-udent. protest though 
the events reported in the press suggest that the 
incidents ore localised and cannot be regarded as a 
protest movement. 
A crowd of schoolpupils who had assembled to escort a 
delegation to the Department of Transportation in Jakarta 
to complain about the recent 33 per cent rise in bus 
fares was rounded up by troops and taken away for 
questioning. Three large posters were confiscated. 
Meanwhile, in Serang, West Java, students at the 
Islamic Teachers' Training College (PGA) organised 
protests against a recent increase in school fees and the 
price they must pay for certificates issued on completion 
of courses in the state ideology. Jakarta Post reported 
on 21 February that 1,500 students protested in their 
classrooms, causing widespread damage. They then marched 
to the local police station to demand the release of the 
chair and deputy--chair of their inter-school students 
union (OSIS) who were being held by the police. 
Army troops were cal led in and used woterconon to 
disperse the demonstrators. According to the paper, a 
student was wounded in the head by a bayonet. 
Four students at the Sarjona Wiyoto Toman Siswo 
University in Jogjakarta have been dismissed and eight 
others suspended following a dispute with the college 
directors over school fees and the philosophical 
direction of the col .lege. The local army command alleges 
that the students were engaged in "subversive activities" 
while the college authorities accused the four dismissed 
student·!> to trying to burn down the campus [ Jakarta Post, 
16 October 1987]. 
Central Java threatened by liberalism 
Major-General Setiyana, the commander of Central Java's 
Diponegoro Division hos meanwhile complained that 
intellectuals in the province ''have been infiltrated by 
liberalism". The commander warned that intellectuals are 
clandestinely promoting liberalism in towns like Solo, 
Jogjakarta, Solotigo, Semarang and Purwokerto and 
spreading the evil to small towns and even to villages 
[Jakarta Post, 14 Morch 1987). 
As usual, Setiyona hod a lot to soy about "left 
extremism" and "right extremism'', the code for Muslim 
activism. He apparently regards liberalism as the 
"ext rem ism of the centre". 
The rights of ex-tapols 
As the general elections draw nearer, former political 
prisoners who were held as communist suspects can expect 
to be the object of continued attention. Whether it is 
for something they are allowed to do or something they 
are forbidden to do, the overall effect is the same - to 
rem ind the public at large of this ever-present threat to 
the security of the nation. 
Over 40,000 ex prisoners disenfranchised 
Since 1985, the regime has said it was checking all 
former communist political prisoners (tapols) to decide 
who will be allowed to vote and who not. Regional 
governments have often released figures of the alleged 
number of ex-tapols in their area, again with the effect 
of keeping the "communist presence" on people's minds. 
The regime has now announced the final figures which 
are based, or so it is claimed, on a screening test 
conducted on 1 Moy last year. There are now said to be 
1,410,333 former political detainees in three categories. 
Category I\ (tried and convicted) 
Category B, (detainees under strong 
suspicion) 





Of these people, 40, 103 ''failed the screening" and are 
forbidden to vote. [Merdeka, 20 February] 
Even those who "passed the screening" are not entirely 
free, as social and political affairs chief in Central 
Java reminds us, for they are not allowed to be nominated 
as candidates. Moreover during the heightened excitement 
of the pre-election period, the security authorities will 
keep an extra close watch on all 300,000 ex tapols in the 
province. Those who ore disenfranchised will not be 
''Tell me, my man, have you got a 'political cleanliness 
certificate'? 
allowed to attend any public meetings at all [Kedaulatan 
Rakyat, 10 March] 
Going on pilgrimage to Mecca 
Early in February, it was officially announced that 
some former PKI political prisoners will now be allowed 
to make the pilgrimage to Mecca. This special concession 
excludes anyone in the A and B categories, and even those 
covered by the new dispensation will have to obtain a 
special permit from their local military commander 
[Surabaya Pos, 18 February]. 
" 
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Ex-tapols and transmigration 
Until recently, ex topols were officially banned from 




who were exiled to the outer islands in the late 1960s, 
notably to Buru and Kalimonton, were prevailed on not to 
return to Java ofter their release, thus becoming some of 
the earliest transm igrants to these areas. 
But lost year the ban turned out to be on obstacle to 
official policy towards people whose land was being 
seized for government projects. Whereas the dispossessed 
families were told that transmigration was their only 
option, ex-topol families living on the land were 
protected from the policy of compulsory transmigration. 
A solution has now been conjured up in the form of a 
decision lifting the ban on transmigration for ex-tapols. 
The new dispensation is not however really a change in 
policy. Although it hos been announced that ex-tapols of 
all three cotegor ies "may now be transmigrated" [the 
wording in Indonesian means that tronsm igration is not 
the active choice of the fom i lies in question], the chief 
of social and political affairs of the Central Java 
provincial government made it clear that "this is meant 
especially for those affected by projects. For those not 
so affected, it is better that they do not transmigrate" 
[ Suara Merdeka, 11 December 1986 ]. 
Indonesian student in West Berlin loses passport 
Pipit Rochijat Kortawidjaja, an Indonesian who has been 
studying in West Berl in fo1 several years, has been 
deprived of his Indonesian passport. The Indonesian 
Consulate has given him instead a non-renewable 6-month 
"document in lieu of passport" valid only for West Berlin 
and Jakarta. This means he will have to return home to 
face certain persecution or seek political asylum. 
This follows an outspoken interview of Pipit on German 
television during a programme last October on "The price 
of New Order stability". Two days before the programme, 
Pipit was instructed by the Indonesian Consul who happens 
to be his wife's uncle not to speak during the programme 
about instability in Indonesia but to say that there was 
no opposition in Indonesia, only dissidents. 
However, in front of the camera, Pipit declared that 
stability in Indonesia was illusory. He pointed at the 
Consul who was also appearing in the programme and 
repeated the instruction he been given two days earlier. 
The effect was electrifying and caused consternation 
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Official warnings of 
"extreme right-left" alliance 
-
The chief public prosecutor in Central Java, Soebardono, 
hos warned that "ex PK I members" who escaped arrest in 
the 1960s are now conducting ''high leve 1 operations" and 
are linking up with "extreme right" forces. Uncoded, this 
means he is warning that Muslim activists in the usroh 
movement (see separate item) are attracting people of 
many political persuasions in areas that were formerly 
PK I stronghCJlds, in the southern regions of Central Java. 
He said there was even (shudder the thought!) a former 
member of Pemuda Rakyat, the PK I youth organisation, who 
was now a "very powerful and daring" Muslim preacher. 
He claimed that the danger of a communist resurgence 
comes not from the 300,000 ex-tapols in the province who 
are under constant surveillance but from those who were 
never caught. There were "large numbers of them" who had 
shown themselves to be skilled at disguising their 
identities and "winning the confidence of the community", 
making it impossible for the authorities to ferret them 
out, he complained [ Kedauloton Rakyat Minggu, 8 March]. 
Statements like this could merely be port of the 
regime's pre-election anti-communist frenzy, but the 
flood of warnings being mode by a variety of provincial 
officials does suggest that the political situation in 
Central Java is for from satisfactory for the regime. 
Gerwani members arrested 
A woman identified only as 'Mrs Har', said to be a 
former Gerwani member, was arrested along with her 
three daughters in Tanjung Priok on 14 February. 
Gerwoni was the leftwing women's organisation that 
was banned in 1965. 
The woman allegedly hod "concealed her true 
identity by becoming a newspaper seller" and setting 
up an agency to handle newspaper distribution. The 
daughters were also allegedly members of the some 
'banned organi sot ion'. 
The report of her arrest says that the authorities 
had been trying "for decades" to find 'Mrs Har' and 
her husband who hos not yet been caught [Berita 
Buono, 1 6 February]. 
A month earlier, the local military command in 
Metro, Central Lampung announced that they were 
carrying out "intensive interrogations" of a woman 
said to be a Gerwoni member. She hod allegedly 
"inveigled herself' into the civil service and hod 
only been discovered after a new system of screening 
government employees had been introduced [Surabaya 
Pos, 17 January 1987). 
among the four Indonesian officials who had turned up to 
put the government's point of view. 
Pipit explains in a letter to T APOL that the Consul cite 
had earlier tried to persuade the television company, 
WDR, not to include him in the programme. 
Two other Indonesian students, I Gusti Nyoman Aryana 
and Paul Bambang, are suffering restrictions by the same 
Consulate and have been given passports needing renewal 
every six months. A sim ilor restriction was placed on 
Pipit in 1983. 
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I THE 1967 MASSACRE -
How faith-healer Mbah Suro was crushed 
In March 1967, the army cracked down on a movement in 
Java Jed by the popular and widely-respected faith-healer 
(dulc.un), MbahSuro. The movementhadallegedlybecominga 
safe haven for army deserters and com m uni st suspects at a 
time when the populations of Cent.ral and East Java were 
still stunned by the post 1965 massacres which killed 
hundreds of thousands of people. It was also a time when 
army units in both provinces were being drastically 
purged of suspected com m uni st sympathisers. 
ff ardly anything has been published about the operation, 
but on 6 March this year, K.ompas gave an account of what 
happened. Although it relies partly on the official 
version of the affair and uses army rhetoric, it is a 
revealing document and is reproduced below in slightly 
abridged form. 
• * * • * 
Randublatung o 
entral Java 
A thick mist hung over the river Solo. The damp morning 
air at the height of the rainy season mode the atmosphere 
still and heavy. The sun hod not yet appeared, making 
this mountainous teak-forest region located on the border 
of Central and East Java seem sti lier than usual. 
But in the silence, troops who had gather two days 
earlier in Blora, the district capital, moved stealthily 
towards their target. A company from Battalion 409 and a 
platoon from Battalion 408, both of the Diponegoro 
Division, cut the target off from the river Solo approach 
to the east. A company from Battalion 410 moved in from 
the north and south, pincering the area. A company of 
RPKAD(now Kopassus)para-commandos who were to spearhead 
the attack, kept watch over the target from the west. 
These activities had the support of territorial troops 
from Kodim 0805/Ngowi, in charge of security in the 
targetted hamlets from the direction of Ngawi district in 
East Java,whiletroops from Kodim 0813/Bondonegoro kept 
watch over all the roads into the region from the east. 
In addition, fifty forestry officials had been mobilised 
to assist the operation, as guides for the troops, as 
couriers and to prepare clearings for helicopters. They 
also had the task of providing coffins and a public 
kitchen, to assist the smooth running of the operation. 
Major Srinordi,commanderof Kodim 0721 /Bloro, who was 
in charge of the operation codenamed Operosi Kamtib 
(Operation Security), had ordered the attack to commence 
at 5.00 am. It was st ii l dork when all the troops under 
his command were in place. As the moment for the attack 
drew near, he left Blora travelling in the direction of 
the target, together withtheRPKAD team commander, Major 
Kosasih and Major Untung Sridadi, commander of Botto I ion 
410. Brigadier-General Widodo, commander of the 
Vllth/Diponegoro Division was meanwhile monitoring the 
operation from Randublatung in the south. 
Fifteen minutes before the order to attack, gunfire was 
heard, not from the attacking forces but from the 
recalcitrants (this is on awkward word in English but it 
seems to be the best rendering of pembongkong, used 
throughout the article, Ed. TAPOL] who were apparently in 
a state of ·readiness up in the hills, concealed by the 
dense forest. In a flash, fighting broke out in an 
isolated hamlet on the bank of the river Solo. 
* * * * * 
The operation was soon to become history. On 5 March 
1967, Operasi Kamtib freed Nginggil Village in Menden 
sub-district, Bloro District from the control of Mboh 
Suro's followers. By the time the sun rolled over to the 
west at 5.00 pm, the often postponed clean-up operations 
were declared to be over. The attacking forces lost three 
men with five wounded. Mboh Suro's personal guards, 
Banteng Ulung and Bonteng Sarinah, lost about a hundred 
k ii led, seven wounded and no fewer than 2,000 arrested. 
Mbah Suro who was said by his followers to be immune was 
among those shot dead. It would have been difficult for 
him to escape because of the army's effective 
encirclement of the target area. Of the casualties among 
the recalcitrants, only six of the dead and four of the 
wounded were local people, proving that Mbah Suro's 
deviotionist teachings had attracted followers from for 
afield. 
Besides putting the reco lcitrants out of action, the 
security forces captured a Vickers pistol, two brenguns, 
three Chung rifles, an AK-47 automatic, a stengun and a 
colt pistol. They burned down 1 l7 homes where 
recalcitrants had taken refuge ... To prevent the spread 
of disease from bodies left lying about, health workers 
went to Nginggil two days later to vaccinate the 
popu lot ion. 
On 6 March, at 10.00 am, those of the detainees who 
were not directly involved in Mbah Suro's adventurism 
were released. The rest were token to Korem 073/Salatiga 
to answer for their deeds. On 8 Morch, the government 
appointed Ngasiman of the Menden police force as acting 
village chief of Nginggil. On 8 April, Major Srinordi, 
the commander of Operosi Komtib, was appointed district 
head of Blora. The Nginggil affair was declared to be 
over and security re-established. 
* * * * * 
Twenty years on, it is interesting to read about the 
crackdown on Mboh Suro and his followers. 
"It was a major event in local history and needs to be 
studied more," said Professor Dr Ibrahim Alfion, Deon of 
the Faculty of Letters at Gojoh Mada University (UGM). In 
1980, Heru Pramono Soewardi, o student at UGM, wrote a 
master's thesis entitled, "The Nginggil faith-healing 
movement of Mbah Suro, and its causes". 
"He did an admirable job collecting data," said 
Professor Dr Sortono Kortodirdjo, chairman of his thesis 
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supervisory team .... His only criticism was that Heru 
Pramono Soewardi did not explained why the government 
launched Operasi Kamtib against Nginggil. What was it 
that prompted such a harsh response? 
A following of half a million 
According to a report ot the Blora Public Prosecutor's 
Office of 6 July 1966, Mbah Suro had a following of half 
a mi I lion people. Explaining why he had so many 
followers, Sartono said: "In times of upheaval like that, 
leaders who promise protection, immunity and a feeling 
of safety will be seen as a 'social umbrella' for groups 
in deep distress They await the advent of someone who 
can take the lead." 
The authorities launched this security operation 
because they could not risk letting the movement survive, 
further threotening the pillars of society, "especially 
because PK I and Old Order followers could have used Mbah 
Suro's spiritual movement for the purposes of 
regrouping." 
* * * * * 
Mbah Suro was born on 17 March 1921, named Moeljono, 
and changed his name to Suro after marrying Sulipah .... 
He was the grandson of the founder of the vi I loge of 
Nginggil and became on acknowledged speaker and a healer 
who used traditional methods. In the early 1950s, he was 
elected Nginggil vii loge chief and in mid 1952, he 
declared himself a dukun, or foith-healer. 
His popularity grew around 1959. Many people came to 
him for treatment and advice. They were willing to endure 
the difficult journey to Nginggil (in Javanese nginggil 
means 'upper') ... which is very isolated. To reach the 
village from any direction, visitors had to go on foot 
for more than five kilometres through thick forest and up 
limestone hills. 
He practised so successfully as a faith-healer that on 
24 April 1962, he resigned as village head •.• and became 
simply Mbah Suro. His very isolated settlement was thrown 
into turmoi I after the defeat of the PK I in 1965. More 
and more people who hod been plunged into deep spirituc1l 
confusion were drown to Nginggil. They included not only 
ordinary villagers coming to pay their respects to Mbah 
Suro but deserters from certain [army) units as well as 
PK I survivors. The isolation reinforced the violent 
nature of people's feelings. In early February 1967, they 
formed two units, Banteng Ulung and Banteng Sorinoh (for 
women). They wore block from head to toe, and had a flag, 
THE 1967 MASSACRE 
--- ~-~~--
One of Mboh Suro's followers. [Kompos 6 Morch 1987] 
a fighting march, firearms and sharp implements. 
Their recalcitrance intensified. Four people who 
entered Mboh Suro territory without permission looking 
for wood were killed. When Mbah Suro was summoned to 
Blora by the authorities for questioning, he ignored the 
summons. An instruction issued by the military commander 
of Central Java on 22 October 1966 ordering his foith-
healing practice to close was ignored. In August that 
year, the East Java provincial mil itory commander banned 
his troops from visiting Nginggil but this was frequently 
disregarded. In the end therefore, Operosi Kamtib was 
launched in order to stomp out these recalcitrants. 
Whatever the justification, such recalcitrance could 
not be allowed to continue. The adventurism of Mboh Suro 
and his many followers quickly become a thing of the 
past •••• 
Ikadin and Supreme Court warn Buyung 
The noted hurnon rights lawyer, Adnan Buyung Nosution hos 
been given a strong reprimond by the lawyers' association 
lkadin and (retired) General Ali Said, chairman of the 
Supreme Court. This follows earlier charges that he was 
in contempt of court for interrupting a judge who was 
reading out the verdict against 1-1.R. Dharsono in January 
1906. Buyung rejected the charge that the defence lawyers 
behaved unethically during Dharsono' trial. [See TAPOL 
Bulletins 74 and 75, March and Moy 1986 for details.] 
General Ali Soid's decision was less severe than the 
punishment suggested earlier by the Jakarta District 
Court which first wonted 13uyung dismissed then later 
asked that he be suspended from practising for six 
months. However, the long-drown-out public accusations 
against Buyung have already destroyed his law practice. 
Many clients and partners hove w i thdrown from any 
association with such a controversial figure. 
Buyung expressed deep disappointment at the foi lure of 
fellow lawyers to defend him. "I protested in court to 
defend the position of barrist·ers but lkodin hos judged 
me purely according to the code of ethics. Their narrow-
m inded approach ignored the political ramifications of 
the cose." 
The final verdict in Buyung's case rests with the 
Minister of Justice who is in no hurry to decide. He 
intends to issue on administrative decision on Buyung's 
future as a practising lawyer. Buyung has protested that 
1 awyers are not government employees and cannot therefore 
by subject to administrative penalties by a government 
deportment. A new law on the courts enacted in 1986 gives 
the Justice Mini5ter powers to take punitive action 
against lawyers; the Justice Minister and the Supreme 
Coutt chairman ore short I)· to issue o joinl· decree on how 
these powers w ii 1 be enforced. [Tempo, 14 February] 
Buyung recently returned to Holland to complete his 
doctoral thesis and will remain there till December 1987. 
TAPOL Bulletin No. 80, April 1987 19 
-- - --·-- I 
POLITICS ' 
Election Special III 
Final preparations are now under way for the general 
elections on 23 April. Various generals in the armed 
forces and in the bureaucracy responsible for controlling 
Indonesia's 'festival of democracy' appear daily in the 
press with guidelines or assessments of the political 
position of the three 'contestants'. While they assert 
that the 1987 elections "will be better than" the 1982 
elections because all 'contestants' now accept the same 
ideology, their statements also reflect a nervousness 
that things could still go wrong. 
The central message from the armed forces is that the 
three parties, the Golkor, the PDI and the PPP, must 
abide by the laws and regulations. Campaigning may not 
commence until 24 Morch (though Golkar chairman, retired 
General Sudharmono, has been addressing Golkar meetings 
all over the country for months), and must end one week 
before polling day. During the so-called 'quiet period' 
which will Jost for a week before and a week after 
polling day, all public meetings, seminars and gatherings 
will be banned. 
ArmedForcescommander-in-chief,General Benny Murdoni, 
continually emphasises that the three parties should 
refrain from holding moss rallies as they are difficult 
to control and might create security problems. His 
favourite formulation is that elections are a routine 
affair and political agitation must be ruled out. 
Armed forces statements regarding security seem to have 
been carefully orchestrated, with generals at the centre 
exuded confidence while those in the regions issue dire 
warnings. Army chief-of-staff General Try Sutrisno gives 
the impression that overall security is good and there 
are no signs of activity aimed at foiling the elections. 
But Major-General Setiana, commander of the Diponegoro 
Division in Central Java, has warned of efforts 'by the 
extreme left and the extreme right" to foil the election. 
He even asserted that "PK I leaders have infi l troted 
everywhere", with "everywhere" even included the armed 
~rces [ Kompas, 6 March]. As his statement came on the 
day the Soviet Foreign Minister, Shevardnadze arrived in 
Indonesia for an official visit, the message may have hod 
another purpose. The East Java commander, Major-General 
Saiful Sulun, also warned of security threats from people 
advocating alternative political concepts [Kompos, 10 
March]. 
Can Golkar's 'victory" be too big? 
Armed forces spokesmen continue to insist that, unlike 
previous elections, the armed forces will not this time 
favour any of the three parties. Initially Golkar set 
itself a target of 70 per cent but more recently this was 
scaled down to 60 per cent so as to appear less greedy. 
The other two 'contestants' are modest enough not to set 
themselves targets. 
General Murdoni who seems worried that a landslide for 
Golkar could strengthen the hand of his arch-rival, 
Golkor's chairman, General Sudharmono, often warns that a 
huge victory for ore of the parties (read Golkar) will be 
unfavourable for the New Order. 
Jakarta Post (20 February) is also worried that "Golkor 
is so well-prepared ... and the other political contenders 
lag so far behind thot some have expressed concern over 
the possibility that the ruling group will gain too large 
a victory". 
.JANGAH HAJ"AK •• BUNE 
KIT,t\ NIV'/TI /KUT.. 
•• PE5TA t>Ef10l<RA~I •• , 
Getting ready for the election: "Come along, Mum, no need 
to cook today. It's Festival of Democracy day." 
Curbs on foreign press 
There will be sweeping restrictions on foreign 
journalists won ting to cover the Indonesian general 
elections. According to The Guardian [ 18 Morch], they 
will not be allowed to visit rural areas under any 
circumstances and visits to an)' parts of the country, 
in the cnpitol and elsewhere, will require special 
permits cind letters of recommendation from the 
Information ministry. 
Additional special permits will be required to 
visit West Papua and East Timor. 
A senior ministry official who announced these 
restrictions said they were "intended to help 
correspondents". When asked how it could help 
journalists to be excluded from rural areas where 
more than 80 per cent of Indonesians live, the 
official said it would be enough to visit the main 
administrative town:;. 
General Sudharmono has struck bock, insisting that 
Pancasilademocracywon't be hampered even if Golkar wins 
JOO per cent of the votes. ''There's nothing wrong with 
it, and there's no low against it," he said [Jakarta 
Post, 14 Morch]. 
Golkar Is fielding a powerful team in New Order terms, 
with an impressive array of New Order worthies on their 
election lists as 'vote-getters'. They include all 34 
cabinet ministers and eleven governors plus hundreds of 
wives, sons and daughters of eminent people, in keeping 
with its high profile as the 'government party'. 
The PDI, once the party of nationalists and Christians 
and now under technocratic leadership, hos extricated 
itself from years of internal rivalry and could 
conceivcbly get more votes than in 1982. It has fielded 
several celebrities from the world of sports and the arts 
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while its main attraction is Megawati Sukarno, daughter 
of Indonesia's first president who, although dead, is 
still popular enough to be a useful 'vote-getter'. 
The PPP, once Muslim, is still dogged by internal 
strife and hos in any case lost the support of its former 
main pillar, theNahdatul Uloma. Many Musi im communities 
are switching their loyalties to Golkar. The party's 18 
per cent share of the vote in 1982 could shrivel to 
almost nothing, placing it third after the PD I. PPP 
chairman John Naro resolved the conflict over candidates 
by excluding anyone from the group of Sudardji (who heads 
the PPP group in parliament) but the latter got their own 
back when eight leading PPP members of parliament 
resigned from the party and urged their followers not to 
vote for the PPP. 
There have been suggestions in the press that if the 
PPP and POI fare too badly, Golkar might actually give 
them some seats. 
OPM mission visits Australia 
\ 
Jacob Proi (rear) with Otto Ondowame (left) and Nick 
Messet. [Newcastle Herold, Australia, 25 November 1987] 
A mission of the OPM (Free Papua Movement) toured 
Australia in November and December last year, addressing 
many meetings about the present state of West Papua's 
struggle for independence. This OPM mission, the first 
ever to visit Australia, was sponsored by the Campaign 
for an Independent East Timor, the West Papua 
Association, the Food Preservers' Union, the Nuclear Free 
and Independent Pacific Group and the Campaign Against 
Repression in the Paci fie and Asia. 
Them ission consisted of Jacob Prai, Otto Ondowame and 
Nick Messet who are al I political exiles in Sweden. Jacob 
Prai jointl)' heads the OPM external organisation with 
Seth Rumkorem who has political asylum in Greece. 
The West Papuans had hoped to lobby the Australian 
government but Australia's ~oreign Minister; Bi 11 Hoyden, 
refused to meet them officially. They met Bi 11 Hayden 
informally at a Labour Party event in Adelaide when the 
Minister told them a formal meeting would not be possible 
because "it would cause more trouble than it would be 
worth" [Canberra Times, 27 November]. Canberra no doubt 
feels its ties with Jakarta are "troubled" enough without 
the problems that would follow a meeting with the OPM. 
In an interview with Robin Osborne, Jacob Prai said 
that Indonesia's presence in West Papua "ensures the 
OPM's continued exiSfence... The behaviour of the 
military guarantees the growth of the OPM despite the 
dangers and difficulties of maintaining such an 
POLITICS 
Indonesia's 'holy trinity' 
Since all three parties now 'contest' the election 
under the same banner, Pancosila, the military regime has 
succeeded where other authoritarian regimes have failed. 
They have created a one-party system with a three-party 
image, the political re-incarnation of the Holy Trinity. 
The problem in this year's election is to make sure 
that the appearance of plurality is retained. The regime 
has devoted much effort in the past year trying to keep 
Golkar's two bedfellows alive. Come election time, it may 
even have to manipulate votes away from Golkar to secure 
the two parties some seats in parliament. 
WEST PAPUA I 
Popuon PDI members flee to PNG 
Two West Papuon families have fled into Papua New 
Guinea to escape being arrested because of their 
support for the POI, one of three parties 
'contesting' the elections in April this year. 
One family consists of Joss Oyaitou, his wife 
Ok tofi no and three sons and a daughter. The father is 
a teacher at Depapre High School, near the provincial 
capitol, Jayapura. The other family consists of Isaak 
and Mije Aposerai and their two children from Sarmi 
district, west of Jayapura. 
Joss Oyoi tou told Times of Papua New Guinea [March 
12-18, 1987] that he was head of the local POI branch 
and had been preparing for the election, making 
posters and submitting news advertisements. 
This is the first report of harassment of members 
of non-Golkar parties. It would confirm the 
impression [see separate item] that in West Papua and 
East Timor where special voting methods have been 
introduced, the regime fears that a strong vote in 
favour of non-Golkar parties might be interpreted as 
a vote against Indonesian rule. This does not mean 
that either the PDl or the PPP promote such views but 
it may be the only way people in these territories 
think they can register their views. 
organisation. Everyone bocks us against the alien 
Indonesians and we have thousands of active supporters." 
[The Australian, 25 November] 
How Canberra could help 
During this visit, the OPM made public several requests 
to the Australian government, in view of the continuing 
abuse of human rights in West Papua. They asked the 
Austral ion government to: 
* discuss with Indonesia human rights claims by the OP M-
F PM, and also put these claims to the United Nations 
Human Rights Commission, 
* support the United Nations High Commission for Refugees 
in resettling Irion Joyan/West Papuon refugees, 
" assist refugees in camps with medical, welfare and 
educational aid, including a scholarship programme, 
* seek at the United Nations a thorough re-examination of 
the 1969 so-called act of self-determination, with a view 
to a timetable for independence being determined by the 
United Nationsl Decolonisation Committee. 
TAPOL Bulletin No. 80, April 1987 21 
West Papuan refugee interviewed I 
At the end or NO\'ember three West Papuans arrived by 
canoe 011 IJoigu, the northernmost island of Australia, and 
asked for political asy.lum. Later others followed, 
bringing the number to eleven. After lengthy efforts and 
in the face of strong opposition from the Australian 
government, two of the refugees were granted asylum while 
the others were granted permission to remain in Australia 
• • • 
Where ore you frorn, where did you go to school anJ what 
work did you do in West Papua? 
My name is Thomas Agaky Wanda. I'm from Wonti vi I loge, 
sub-district of Lower Waropen in the district of Japen-
Waropen (Serui). I was born on 28 June 1949. I attended a 
community 5chool from 1956 to 1959 in Wonti, sti II under 
the Dutch. Then I went to lower middle school in 1960 in 
Serui and studied there until 1963, when West Pc1pua was 
under UN administralion (UNTEA). From 1964 till 1966 1 
attended Dok V Technical School in Kotabcmi (later 
Sukarnopuru). West Papua was by then under Indonesian 
rule. [Hollandia, the capitol of West Papua under the 
Dutch, was renamed Kol'abaru after Indonesian annexation, 
then renamed Sukarnopurn. After the m iii tory took power, 
it was again renamed Joyapvrc1. Ed. TAPOL] 
In 1968, I got a j~>b at the Merauke office of the Irion 
Joyo Provincial Inspectorate of Traffic and Rood 
Transportation (ILLAJR). In 1980, I attended ai ufternoon 
course at the St Anthonius Catholic Church School in 
Meravke while working in the morning as a government 
employee. This went on until 1 was arrested and detained 
on 30 June 1981. 
Say something about the experiences that led t-o your 
arrest and detention at the Jayapura military command. 
In 1961, before the Dutch left West Papua, I witnessed 
a ceremony to raise the Morning Star (Kejora) Flag [the 
flag later adopted by the OPM, the Free Papua Movement, 
for on independent repub lie of West Papua]. I was also 
given small flags and other symbols. From that time on, I 
hod a strong sense of being port of the West Popuon 
notion. 
After arriving in Kotabaru, I wos aware of various 
[pro-independence] events in Sorong, Manokwari, Biak, 
Nabi re- Enarota Ii, Sol'm i and Kotobaru which ins pi red me to 
become port of these developments. In 1967, I met Izak 
M.I. in Abepura, a district. of Sukarnopura. He told me 
many things and I become a member of a group working 
under his leadership. 
In 1960, I got a job in the lrian Joya Provincial Rood 
Trnffic and Trnnsportotion Inspectorate (ILLAJR) and 
moved to M~rauke in June that year. It was at this time 
that I began contacting several people for secret 
political discussions, in port icular the OPM or' 
Orgonisosi Por>ua Menleko (Free Papua Movement). 
Testing West Popuon opinion, Indonesian style 
In 1969oPanitiaPemilihanDewanMusyoworahPenentuon 
Pendopot Rakyat( Committee to Choose the Consultative 
Council for Determining the People's Opinion), known for 
short as Popem Demus Pepero, was set up under Mero•Jke 
dist-rict chief, Gregorius A. Darmowidigdo as chairman. It 
hod a rvmber of sections including a transportation 
until another co11ntrlj was willing to take them in. One of 
the two is Thomas Agal<IJ ll'anda who was also one of t/Je 
first three H'est Papuan canoe-people. 
Wanda is now living in Cairns, Queensland. He wrote ta 
TA POL recently offering to give an account of Ids 
experiences. The fallawi11g is the first part of his story 
whic/J he told in answer to our questions. 
• • 
section run by t·he ILLAJR. I become o driver for the 
Committee and sow what the Indonesian government did to 
West Papunns who wont·ed to express their opinions and 
were already taking action against Indonesian rule. 
Everyone suspected of opposing the government was 
arrested, detained, beaten, maltreated and tortured. In 
fact, even before 1969, opponents of the government were 
being arrested and put on trial, including government 
employees, members of the armed forces, and pol icemen, as 
well as ordinary people. In response to these pre-1969 
arrests,theOPM launched on operation against RPKAD (now 
Kopassus)poracommanclos in Erombuond Janggondur kompurigs 
in the vicinity of the River Moro when about thirty 
Indonesian soldiers were k i lied. 
E veryonewhosurrendered was murdered including two who 
were shot dead by Indonesian troops in K war Kampung, some 
twenty kilometres inside Papua New Guinea. Even In those 
days, Indonesia was prepared enter foreign ten-Hory. In 
Sota Kompung, o PNG Popuan was arrested. His e)'es were 
torn from their sockets and he died under torlure after 
his fingers, arms and legs had been mutilated. 
How did the Indonesians organise the 1969 act of 'free' 
choice? 
Besides the iron fist, Indonesia used other methods 
during Pepera. [This was the Indonesian name for the 'act 
of free choice'.] In Merauk,~, Pepera began on 14 July 
1969 when heads of traditional tribes, war tribes and 
kampungs from Asmat, Jakoi and Auwyu were appoirited 
membersaf PapernDemusPeperaand later became members of 
the Consultative Council for the Determination of the 
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People's Opinion. [This was the body composed of 1,025 
members which took the unanimous decision in August 1969 
to accept Indonesian rule.] 
They were all were illiterate, simple-minded men, 
unable to read or write. Nevertheless, they were told to 
sign statements pledging their undying loyalty to the 
slogan, "Indonesia from West to East''. Later the slogan 
was changed to "Indonesia from Sabang to Merauke". 
[Sabang is on the most westerly tip of Sumatra.] After 
signing these statements they were given clothes, wrist-
waf'ches, radios or bicyles as rewards. 
Departmental chiefs, Papuans as welf as Indonesians, 
were also told to sign these statements. Village-heads 
and public figures in and around Merauke were told to 
sign, regardless of whether they were Papuans or 
Indonesians who had lived in West Papua for a long time. 
Everyone had to sign statements saying they were in 
favour of Indonesian rule. 
When Pepera was completed, everyone who had signed was 
given a reward in accordance with their status. Villagers 
got cigarettes, money, radios or bicycles while 
departmentcil heads got promo! ion, extra education, cars, 
houses and so on. All members of Parliament (DPRGR), the 
Regional Assembly (DPRD), all district heads throughout 
the province of West Irion (as it was then called) signed 
statements and got the same rewards as the departmental 
chiefs. These were Indonesia's velvet glove methods. 
Indonesia adopted its own methods and it did not comply 
with the agreement regarding a referendum concluded 
between Indonesia and the Nether lands in August 1962 and 
ratified by the United Nations. It refused to use the 
principle of 'one man one vote'. 
When did you first become involved with the OPM? 
Back in 1970, a man by the name of A. Baudi arrived in 
Merauke from Jayapura and set up a small group where I 
was the most active person. In 1975, the 1701 district 
military command sent two corporals, S. Opur and Daniel 
Kena, to Merauke with instructions to trap me, but they 
failed. They arrested a colleague of mine, Alfons 
Kanggam, a native of Muyu region, who had been a sergeant 
in the Papuan Volunteers Corps set up by the Dutch when 
they were sti II resisting the Indonesians. The corporals 
were unable to extract any information from him about me. 
On one occasion they gave him beer to get him drunk and 
make him talk but this did not work either, so after 
holding him for a month, they set him free. 
In 19781 was summoned to the Mako Sub Den Porn 172/2- 1 
(HQoftheCommandof the Military Police sub-detachment) 
in Merauke because of a letter from Fritz M. Kirihio [a 
West Papuan refugee] in the Netherlands asking for 
information about living conditions in West Papua. I was 
summoned because I had promised to answer the letter. 
Refugees worried about the future 
West P~uan refugees in Blackwater camp, near Vanimo, 
have told The Times of Papua New Guinea [ 12-16 March] 
that they are still in the dark about their future 
despite plans said to be under way to transfer them to a 
new camp in East Awin, Western Province. 
They have not yet been given a date for their transfer 
to the new camp by the UN High Commission for Refugees. A 
UNHCR official has told them the government must first 
compensate the landowners of 100,000 hectares where the 
camp will be situated. The PNG is planning to spend one 
million kina to develop the area, but local peo"ple are 
demanding on extra six m ii lion k ina because the 
government wants to lease the land for 99 years. 
T APOL understands from independent sources that a sma 11 
group of refugees has already been sent to East Awin to 
start building houses, and that others will follow in 
INTERVIEW 
Thomas Agoky Wanda, front right, with other West Papuan 
refugees. [Cairns Post, 23 July 1986] 
But l had been summoned earlier as v1el l by the Merauke 
Public Prosecutor's Office with relatives of mine, 
Mathias Morey and his wife Den Marey-Anderi, and Jazon 
Numberi. From May ti II October 1978, I had to report 
periodically to the authorities and could not leave 
Merauke, but they discovered nothing to incriminate me so 
I was freed from these restrictions. 
Others involved in similar cases at the time included 
Ignatius Mal ibai and Jurcis Jawa. We knew each other 
before so after being freed, we decided to continue with 
our activities as a group. We decided that some of us 
should leave Merauke and managed to get several people 
out, Ignatius Malibai, Tarcis Jawa, Melki Salosa, Alex 
Tumbay and Oscar Wombon, along with four Indian 
colleagues. They all left Mercuke and reached PNG safely 
where flll of them are now living, except Alex Tumbay who 
has since died. 
To be continued in the next issue. 
--
WEST PAPUAN REFUGEES 
~~~-~~~~---~~-~~-~~~~~~~ 
groups of o hundred. This appears to have happened in 
advance of a final resolution of the land problem. 
The refugees in Blackwater may be worried about the 
slow rate of progress. Ideally, the camp ought to be 
ready and occupied before the forthcoming general 
elections in Papua New Guinea. A change of government in 
Port Moresby might set back the prospects for all West 
Papuan refugees who now at least seem assured of being 
allowed to remain in PNG, following the Wingti 
government's decision last year to accede to the UN 
Convention on Refugees. 
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Pramoedya's books are good but •••• 
"Pramoedya's books are indeed good as works of 
literature, but a society {concerned with) security 
ought not to be dazzled by their literary quality 
because we must also take account of their negative 
aspects." 
Thus spoke (retired) General Hori Suharto, 
Indonesia's Attorney General, when appearing before a 
parliamentary commission recently. 
He was being closely questioned by Mrs Roebiono 
Kertapati who wanted to know why the books of , 
Promoedyo Anonta T oer had been banned even though 
they were acknowledged to be literary works of 
standing. She even wanted to know whether the 
Attorney General had read any of the books himself 
before deciding to ban them. 
The newspaper which reported this rather unusual 
exchange did not say how the Attorney General replied 
but another parliamentarian who was chairing the 
, meeting came to his assistance, saying that if the 
books hod been banned, then of course the Attorney 
General must hove read them first. 
The final word was with the general: "We must treat 
Promoedyo's books with caution because we hove for a 
long time studied the theories of communism and know 
communism to its very roots. If we know communism to 
its roots, then naturally communism knows us just as 
thoroughly. So ... it isn't a question of whether 
Promoedya's books are good literature. We must deal 
with communism first and foremost as a question of 
security ..•• " [Merdeka, 4 December 1967] 
Continued from page 1. 
Since Mochtar claimed in his statement that "we don't 
want these people and if they wont to go to Portugal, let 
them" [Kompos, 28 February], Jakarta should hove had no 
objection to the students leaving in this way. However, 
Mochtor's feigned lock concern about whether the students 
remain or go conceals the fear that, if allowed to leave, 
the students could seriously damage Indonesia's case on 
t·he international arena. 
Joao Loff Bareto, the Portuguese lawyer acting for the 
students hos recently warned that they were being 
prevented from leaving because they know too much about 
the war in Timor. He feared they might soon disappear. 
Until the latest Indonesian move, it was well 
established that all parties involved, the Portuguese 
government, the Dutch government {which represents 
Portugal's interests in Jakarta) and Indonesia knew that 
the four would travel on Portuguese passports. Serious 
problems arose however ofter the Dutch embassy forced the 
men to leave the embassy, threatening to coll the 
Indonesian pol ice if they resisted. The students were 
told agreement hod been reached with the Indonesians 
about arrangements for their departure. 
For from the Portuguese making political capitol out of 
the affair, this is precisely what Jakarta is doing. An 
lndonesionstatementattheUN Human Rights Commission in 
February foreshadows a breakdown in the shaky talks 
toking place between Indonesia and Portugal under UN 
auspices. Indonesia is evidently infuriated at Portugal's 
current diplomatic offensive regarding East Timar {see 
separate item) and seems bent on using every opportunity 
to malign Portugal. The students who thought they could 
rely on the Dutch to help them leave hove now become 
hostages to Indonesian blackmail. 
Indonesian MPs useless, 
says British MP 
A delegation of Indonesian parliamentarians that visited 
the British House of Commons and hod a meeting with the 
Foreign Affairs Select Committee come under attack by a 
senior member of the Committee. The veteran Labour MP, 
Ion Mikordo, said the visiting MPs hod "no influence 
whatever" and were nothing more than appointees of 
President Suharto and leaders of the armed forces. 
According to the dif,lomatic correspondent of The Daily 
Telegraph [12 Morch, Mikardo said they were unable to 
answer a single question about Indonesia "and didn't ask 
us a single question about Britain". 
Interestingly, the Conservative newspaper gave more 
prominence to Ian Mikardo's remarks than to those of a 
Conservative MP, Peter Thomas, who thought the MPs were 
"very representative" and welcomed their visit because 
Britain is trying to have closer relations with 
Indonesia. 
Them ission was led by Hordjantho of the PDI, deputy-
chairman of the lower house, the DPR. The other five 
members consisted of Soebiyono, armed forces fraction, 
Suyono and Sugianto of Golkar, Tijikan of the PPP and 
Sutomo of the PDI. Besides the UK, they also visited the 
Netherlands. 
"Crucial" problems 
Before the mission left Indonesia, they were given 
their marching orders by President Suharto who said their 
task was to convince Dutch and British parliamentarians 
about Indonesia's human rights record, to explain why 
political prisoners were being executed, and to clarify 
the question of East Timor "once and for all". [lan 
Mikardo can hardly hove realised how apposite his remarks 
were!] 
After receiving these instructions, Hardjantho said 
the three questions were regarded as very crucial because 
they were frequently used "to corner Indonesia". It would 
be the mission's task, he said, to persuade British and 
Dutch MPs to convince their governments on these matters 
[ Pel ito, 3 March 1987]. 
While in the UK, the mission was the guest of the 
Central Office of Information, a government agency, 
spending only a few hours at House of Commons. 
A similar DPR mission is also being sent to Australia 
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